Daily Papers

Privacy concerns in client-server machine learning have given rise to private inference (PI), where neural inference occurs directly on encrypted inputs. PI protects clients' personal data and the server's intellectual property. A common practice in PI is to use garbled circuits to compute nonlinear functions privately, namely ReLUs. However, garbled circuits suffer from high storage, bandwidth, and latency costs. To mitigate these issues, PI-friendly polynomial activation functions have been employed to replace ReLU. In this work, we ask: Is it feasible to substitute all ReLUs with low-degree polynomial activation functions for building deep, privacy-friendly neural networks? We explore this question by analyzing the challenges of substituting ReLUs with polynomials, starting with simple drop-and-replace solutions to novel, more involved replace-and-retrain strategies. We examine the limitations of each method and provide commentary on the use of polynomial activation functions for PI. We find all evaluated solutions suffer from the escaping activation problem: forward activation values inevitably begin to expand at an exponential rate away from stable regions of the polynomials, which leads to exploding values (NaNs) or poor approximations.

Refusal refers to the functional behavior enabling safety-aligned language models to reject harmful or unethical prompts. Following the growing scientific interest in mechanistic interpretability, recent work encoded refusal behavior as a single direction in the model's latent space; e.g., computed as the difference between the centroids of harmful and harmless prompt representations. However, emerging evidence suggests that concepts in LLMs often appear to be encoded as a low-dimensional manifold embedded in the high-dimensional latent space. Motivated by these findings, we propose a novel method leveraging Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs) to extract multiple refusal directions. To this end, we first prove that SOMs generalize the prior work's difference-in-means technique. We then train SOMs on harmful prompt representations to identify multiple neurons. By subtracting the centroid of harmless representations from each neuron, we derive a set of multiple directions expressing the refusal concept. We validate our method on an extensive experimental setup, demonstrating that ablating multiple directions from models' internals outperforms not only the single-direction baseline but also specialized jailbreak algorithms, leading to an effective suppression of refusal. Finally, we conclude by analyzing the mechanistic implications of our approach.

This study reveals a previously unexplored vulnerability in the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs). Existing aligned LLMs predominantly respond to unsafe queries with refusals, which often begin with a fixed set of prefixes (I'm sorry). We demonstrate that this rigid refusal pattern is a vulnerability and introduce a novel refusal unlearning technique that exploits it. Specifically, we fine-tune LLMs using merely 1,000 benign samples, where each response is prepended with a refusal prefix. The underlying intuition is to disrupt the refusal completion pathway, thereby driving the model to forget how to refuse while following harmful instructions. This intuition is further supported by theoretical proofs. We apply this approach to a total of 16 LLMs, including various open-source models from Llama, Qwen, and Gemma families, as well as closed-source models such as Gemini and GPT. Experimental results show that the safety scores of previously aligned LLMs degrade both consistently and substantially. Importantly, we verify that the observed gain cannot be attributed to plain fine-tuning or random prefix effects. Our findings suggest that current safety alignment may rely heavily on token sequence memorization rather than reasoning, motivating future work beyond simple refusal mechanisms. Code has been released: https://github.com/guoyang9/refusal-unlearning.

Neural networks have proven to be a highly effective tool for solving complex problems in many areas of life. Recently, their importance and practical usability have further been reinforced with the advent of deep learning. One of the important conditions for the success of neural networks is the choice of an appropriate activation function introducing non-linearity into the model. Many types of these functions have been proposed in the literature in the past, but there is no single comprehensive source containing their exhaustive overview. The absence of this overview, even in our experience, leads to redundancy and the unintentional rediscovery of already existing activation functions. To bridge this gap, our paper presents an extensive survey involving 400 activation functions, which is several times larger in scale than previous surveys. Our comprehensive compilation also references these surveys; however, its main goal is to provide the most comprehensive overview and systematization of previously published activation functions with links to their original sources. The secondary aim is to update the current understanding of this family of functions.

We investigate the origins of massive activations in large language models (LLMs) and identify a specific layer named the Massive Emergence Layer (ME Layer), that is consistently observed across model families, where massive activations first emerge and subsequently propagate to deeper layers through residual connections. We show that, within the ME Layer both the RMSNorm and the FFN parameters jointly contribute to the emergence of massive activations. Once formed, the massive activation token representation remains largely invariant across layers, reducing the diversity of hidden representations passed to the attention module. Motivated by this limitation, we propose a simple and effective method to reduce the rigidity of the massive activation token. Our approach consistently improves LLM performance across multiple tasks, including instruction following and math reasoning, in both training free and fine tuning settings. Moreover, we show that our method mitigates attention sinks by selectively weakening their influence, elucidating their origin at the hidden state level and shedding new light on principled mitigation strategies.

Safety alignment instills in Large Language Models (LLMs) a critical capacity to refuse malicious requests. Prior works have modeled this refusal mechanism as a single linear direction in the activation space. We posit that this is an oversimplification that conflates two functionally distinct neural processes: the detection of harm and the execution of a refusal. In this work, we deconstruct this single representation into a Harm Detection Direction and a Refusal Execution Direction. Leveraging this fine-grained model, we introduce Differentiated Bi-Directional Intervention (DBDI), a new white-box framework that precisely neutralizes the safety alignment at critical layer. DBDI applies adaptive projection nullification to the refusal execution direction while suppressing the harm detection direction via direct steering. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DBDI outperforms prominent jailbreaking methods, achieving up to a 97.88\% attack success rate on models such as Llama-2. By providing a more granular and mechanistic framework, our work offers a new direction for the in-depth understanding of LLM safety alignment.

Despite their impressive capabilities, current Text-to-Image (T2I) models remain prone to generating unsafe and toxic content. While activation steering offers a promising inference-time intervention, we observe that linear activation steering frequently degrades image quality when applied to benign prompts. To address this trade-off, we first construct SafeSteerDataset, a contrastive dataset containing 2300 safe and unsafe prompt pairs with high cosine similarity. Leveraging this data, we propose Conditioned Activation Transport (CAT), a framework that employs a geometry-based conditioning mechanism and nonlinear transport maps. By conditioning transport maps to activate only within unsafe activation regions, we minimize interference with benign queries. We validate our approach on two state-of-the-art architectures: Z-Image and Infinity. Experiments demonstrate that CAT generalizes effectively across these backbones, significantly reducing Attack Success Rate while maintaining image fidelity compared to unsteered generations. Warning: This paper contains potentially offensive text and images.

Refusal on harmful prompts is a key safety behaviour in instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs), yet the internal causes of this behaviour remain poorly understood. We study two public instruction-tuned models, Gemma-2-2B-IT and LLaMA-3.1-8B-IT, using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) trained on residual-stream activations. Given a harmful prompt, we search the SAE latent space for feature sets whose ablation flips the model from refusal to compliance, demonstrating causal influence and creating a jailbreak. Our search proceeds in three stages: (1) Refusal Direction: find a refusal-mediating direction and collect SAE features near that direction; (2) Greedy Filtering: prune to a minimal set; and (3) Interaction Discovery: fit a factorization machine (FM) that captures nonlinear interactions among the remaining active features and the minimal set. This pipeline yields a broad set of jailbreak-critical features, offering insight into the mechanistic basis of refusal. Moreover, we find evidence of redundant features that remain dormant unless earlier features are suppressed. Our findings highlight the potential for fine-grained auditing and targeted intervention in safety behaviours by manipulating the interpretable latent space.

Activation steering is a promising technique for controlling LLM behavior by adding semantically meaningful vectors directly into a model's hidden states during inference. It is often framed as a precise, interpretable, and potentially safer alternative to fine-tuning. We demonstrate the opposite: steering systematically breaks model alignment safeguards, making it comply with harmful requests. Through extensive experiments on different model families, we show that even steering in a random direction can increase the probability of harmful compliance from 0% to 2-27%. Alarmingly, steering benign features from a sparse autoencoder (SAE), a common source of interpretable directions, increases these rates by a further 2-4%. Finally, we show that combining 20 randomly sampled vectors that jailbreak a single prompt creates a universal attack, significantly increasing harmful compliance on unseen requests. These results challenge the paradigm of safety through interpretability, showing that precise control over model internals does not guarantee precise control over model behavior.

The safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) can be circumvented through adversarially crafted inputs, yet the mechanisms by which these attacks bypass safety barriers remain poorly understood. Prior work suggests that a single refusal direction in the model's activation space determines whether an LLM refuses a request. In this study, we propose a novel gradient-based approach to representation engineering and use it to identify refusal directions. Contrary to prior work, we uncover multiple independent directions and even multi-dimensional concept cones that mediate refusal. Moreover, we show that orthogonality alone does not imply independence under intervention, motivating the notion of representational independence that accounts for both linear and non-linear effects. Using this framework, we identify mechanistically independent refusal directions. We show that refusal mechanisms in LLMs are governed by complex spatial structures and identify functionally independent directions, confirming that multiple distinct mechanisms drive refusal behavior. Our gradient-based approach uncovers these mechanisms and can further serve as a foundation for future work on understanding LLMs.

Conversational large language models are fine-tuned for both instruction-following and safety, resulting in models that obey benign requests but refuse harmful ones. While this refusal behavior is widespread across chat models, its underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this work, we show that refusal is mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, across 13 popular open-source chat models up to 72B parameters in size. Specifically, for each model, we find a single direction such that erasing this direction from the model's residual stream activations prevents it from refusing harmful instructions, while adding this direction elicits refusal on even harmless instructions. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel white-box jailbreak method that surgically disables refusal with minimal effect on other capabilities. Finally, we mechanistically analyze how adversarial suffixes suppress propagation of the refusal-mediating direction. Our findings underscore the brittleness of current safety fine-tuning methods. More broadly, our work showcases how an understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical methods for controlling model behavior.

Refusal mechanisms in large language models (LLMs) are essential for ensuring safety. Recent research has revealed that refusal behavior can be mediated by a single direction in activation space, enabling targeted interventions to bypass refusals. While this is primarily demonstrated in an English-centric context, appropriate refusal behavior is important for any language, but poorly understood. In this paper, we investigate the refusal behavior in LLMs across 14 languages using PolyRefuse, a multilingual safety dataset created by translating malicious and benign English prompts into these languages. We uncover the surprising cross-lingual universality of the refusal direction: a vector extracted from English can bypass refusals in other languages with near-perfect effectiveness, without any additional fine-tuning. Even more remarkably, refusal directions derived from any safety-aligned language transfer seamlessly to others. We attribute this transferability to the parallelism of refusal vectors across languages in the embedding space and identify the underlying mechanism behind cross-lingual jailbreaks. These findings provide actionable insights for building more robust multilingual safety defenses and pave the way for a deeper mechanistic understanding of cross-lingual vulnerabilities in LLMs.

LLMs increasingly exhibit over-refusal behavior, where safety mechanisms cause models to reject benign instructions that superficially resemble harmful content. This phenomena diminishes utility in production applications that repeatedly rely on common prompt templates or applications that frequently rely on LLMs for specific tasks (e.g. sentiment analysis, language translation). Through comprehensive evaluation, we demonstrate that LLMs still tend to refuse responses to harmful instructions when those instructions are reframed to appear as benign tasks. Our mechanistic analysis reveal that LLMs follow distinct "constellation" patterns in embedding space as representations traverse layers, with each task maintaining consistent trajectories that shift predictably between refusal and non-refusal cases. We introduce SafeConstellations, an inference-time trajectory-shifting approach that tracks task-specific trajectory patterns and guides representations toward non-refusal pathways. By selectively guiding model behavior only on tasks prone to over-refusal, and by preserving general model behavior, our method reduces over-refusal rates by up to 73% with minimal impact on utility-offering a principled approach to mitigating over-refusals.

LLMs have shown remarkable capabilities, but precisely controlling their response behavior remains challenging. Existing activation steering methods alter LLM behavior indiscriminately, limiting their practical applicability in settings where selective responses are essential, such as content moderation or domain-specific assistants. In this paper, we propose Conditional Activation Steering (CAST), which analyzes LLM activation patterns during inference to selectively apply or withhold activation steering based on the input context. Our method is based on the observation that different categories of prompts activate distinct patterns in the model's hidden states. Using CAST, one can systematically control LLM behavior with rules like "if input is about hate speech or adult content, then refuse" or "if input is not about legal advice, then refuse." This allows for selective modification of responses to specific content while maintaining normal responses to other content, all without requiring weight optimization. We release an open-source implementation of our framework at github.com/IBM/activation-steering .

Large language models (LLMs) frequently produce false refusals, declining benign requests that contain terms resembling unsafe queries. We address this challenge by introducing two comprehensive benchmarks: the Exaggerated Safety Benchmark (XSB) for single-turn prompts, annotated with "Focus" keywords that identify refusal-inducing triggers, and the Multi-turn Scenario-based Exaggerated Safety Benchmark (MS-XSB), which systematically evaluates refusal calibration in realistic, context-rich dialog settings. Our benchmarks reveal that exaggerated refusals persist across diverse recent LLMs and are especially pronounced in complex, multi-turn scenarios. To mitigate these failures, we leverage post-hoc explanation methods to identify refusal triggers and deploy three lightweight, model-agnostic approaches, ignore-word instructions, prompt rephrasing, and attention steering, at inference time, all without retraining or parameter access. Experiments on four instruction-tuned Llama models demonstrate that these strategies substantially improve compliance on safe prompts while maintaining robust safety protections. Our findings establish a reproducible framework for diagnosing and mitigating exaggerated refusals, highlighting practical pathways to safer and more helpful LLM deployments.

Mechanistic interpretability seeks to understand the internal mechanisms of machine learning models, where localization -- identifying the important model components -- is a key step. Activation patching, also known as causal tracing or interchange intervention, is a standard technique for this task (Vig et al., 2020), but the literature contains many variants with little consensus on the choice of hyperparameters or methodology. In this work, we systematically examine the impact of methodological details in activation patching, including evaluation metrics and corruption methods. In several settings of localization and circuit discovery in language models, we find that varying these hyperparameters could lead to disparate interpretability results. Backed by empirical observations, we give conceptual arguments for why certain metrics or methods may be preferred. Finally, we provide recommendations for the best practices of activation patching going forwards.

We revisit a universally accepted but under-examined design choice in every modern LLM: a token index is looked up once at the input embedding layer and then permanently discarded. This single-injection assumption induces two structural failures: (i) the Rare Token Problem, where a Zipf-type distribution of vocabulary causes rare-token embeddings are chronically under-trained due to receiving a fraction of the cumulative gradient signal compared to common tokens; and (ii) the Contextual Collapse Problem, where limited parameters models map distributionally similar tokens to indistinguishable hidden states. As an attempt to address both, we propose TIDE, which augments the standard transformer with EmbeddingMemory: an ensemble of K independent MemoryBlocks that map token indices to context-free semantic vectors, computed once and injected into every layer through a depth-conditioned softmax router with a learnable null bank. We theoretically and empirically establish the benefits of TIDE in addressing the issues associated with single-token identity injection as well as improve performance across multiple language modeling and downstream tasks.

Reliably controlling the behavior of large language models is a pressing open problem. Existing methods include supervised finetuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, prompt engineering and guided decoding. We instead investigate activation engineering: modifying activations at inference-time to predictably alter model behavior. We bias the forward pass with a 'steering vector' implicitly specified through natural language. Past work learned these steering vectors; our Activation Addition (ActAdd) method instead computes them by taking the activation differences which result from pairs of prompts. We demonstrate ActAdd on GPT-2 on OpenWebText and ConceptNet, and replicate the effect on Llama-13B and GPT-J-6B. Our approach yields inference-time control over high-level properties of output & preserves performance on off-target topics. The method requires far less compute and implementation effort than finetuning and RLHF, allows for natural language specification by users, and its overhead scales naturally with model size.

Large language models (LLMs) frequently refuse to respond to pseudo-malicious instructions: semantically harmless input queries triggering unnecessary LLM refusals due to conservative safety alignment, significantly impairing user experience. Collecting such instructions is crucial for evaluating and mitigating over-refusals, but existing instruction curation methods, like manual creation or instruction rewriting, either lack scalability or fail to produce sufficiently diverse and effective refusal-inducing prompts. To address these limitations, we introduce EVOREFUSE, a prompt optimization approach that generates diverse pseudo-malicious instructions consistently eliciting confident refusals across LLMs. EVOREFUSE employs an evolutionary algorithm exploring the instruction space in more diverse directions than existing methods via mutation strategies and recombination, and iteratively evolves seed instructions to maximize evidence lower bound on LLM refusal probability. Using EVOREFUSE, we create two novel datasets: EVOREFUSE-TEST, a benchmark of 582 pseudo-malicious instructions that outperforms the next-best benchmark with 140.41% higher average refusal triggering rate across 9 LLMs, 34.86% greater lexical diversity, and 40.03% improved LLM response confidence scores; and EVOREFUSE-ALIGN, which provides 3,000 pseudo-malicious instructions with responses for supervised and preference-based alignment training. LLAMA3.1-8B-INSTRUCT supervisedly fine-tuned on EVOREFUSE-ALIGN achieves up to 14.31% fewer over-refusals than models trained on the second-best alignment dataset, without compromising safety. Our analysis with EVOREFUSE-TEST reveals models trigger over-refusals by overly focusing on sensitive keywords while ignoring broader context.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable capabilities across various domains. Accompanying the evolving capabilities and expanding deployment scenarios of LLMs, their deployment challenges escalate due to their sheer scale and the advanced yet complex activation designs prevalent in notable model series, such as Llama, Gemma, and Mistral. These challenges have become particularly pronounced in resource-constrained deployment scenarios, where mitigating inference efficiency bottlenecks is imperative. Among various recent efforts, activation approximation has emerged as a promising avenue for pursuing inference efficiency, sometimes considered indispensable in applications such as private inference. Despite achieving substantial speedups with minimal impact on utility, even appearing sound and practical for real-world deployment, the safety implications of activation approximations remain unclear. In this work, we fill this critical gap in LLM safety by conducting the first systematic safety evaluation of activation approximations. Our safety vetting spans seven sota techniques across three popular categories, revealing consistent safety degradation across ten safety-aligned LLMs.

Activation Patching is a method of directly computing causal attributions of behavior to model components. However, applying it exhaustively requires a sweep with cost scaling linearly in the number of model components, which can be prohibitively expensive for SoTA Large Language Models (LLMs). We investigate Attribution Patching (AtP), a fast gradient-based approximation to Activation Patching and find two classes of failure modes of AtP which lead to significant false negatives. We propose a variant of AtP called AtP*, with two changes to address these failure modes while retaining scalability. We present the first systematic study of AtP and alternative methods for faster activation patching and show that AtP significantly outperforms all other investigated methods, with AtP* providing further significant improvement. Finally, we provide a method to bound the probability of remaining false negatives of AtP* estimates.

Large language models (LLMs), despite being safety-aligned, exhibit brittle refusal behaviors that can be circumvented by simple linguistic changes. As tense jailbreaking demonstrates that models refusing harmful requests often comply when rephrased in past tense, a critical generalization gap is revealed in current alignment methods whose underlying mechanisms are poorly understood. In this work, we introduce Activation-Scaling Guard (ASGuard), an insightful, mechanistically-informed framework that surgically mitigates this specific vulnerability. In the first step, we use circuit analysis to identify the specific attention heads causally linked to the targeted jailbreaking such as a tense-changing attack. Second, we train a precise, channel-wise scaling vector to recalibrate the activation of tense vulnerable heads. Lastly, we apply it into a "preventative fine-tuning", forcing the model to learn a more robust refusal mechanism. Across four LLMs, ASGuard effectively reduces the attack success rate of targeted jailbreaking while preserving general capabilities and minimizing over refusal, achieving a Pareto-optimal balance between safety and utility. Our findings underscore how adversarial suffixes suppress the propagation of the refusal-mediating direction, based on mechanistic analysis. Furthermore, our work showcases how a deep understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical, efficient, and targeted methods for adjusting model behavior, charting a course for more reliable and interpretable AI safety.

Adapting LLM agents to domain-specific tool calling remains notably brittle under evolving interfaces. Prompt and schema engineering is easy to deploy but often fragile under distribution shift and strict parsers, while continual parameter-efficient fine-tuning improves reliability at the cost of training, maintenance, and potential forgetting. We identify a critical Lazy Agent failure mode where tool necessity is nearly perfectly decodable from mid-layer activations, yet the model remains conservative in entering tool mode, revealing a representation-behavior gap. We propose Activation Steering Adapter (ASA), a training-free, inference-time controller that performs a single-shot mid-layer intervention and targets tool domains via a router-conditioned mixture of steering vectors with a probe-guided signed gate to amplify true intent while suppressing spurious triggers. On MTU-Bench with Qwen2.5-1.5B, ASA improves strict tool-use F1 from 0.18 to 0.50 while reducing the false positive rate from 0.15 to 0.05, using only about 20KB of portable assets and no weight updates.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance, they remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that circumvent safety constraints. Existing strategies, ranging from heuristic prompt engineering to computationally intensive optimization, often face significant trade-offs between effectiveness and efficiency. In this work, we propose Contextual Representation Ablation (CRA), a novel inference-time intervention framework designed to dynamically silence model guardrails. Predicated on the geometric insight that refusal behaviors are mediated by specific low-rank subspaces within the model's hidden states, CRA identifies and suppresses these refusal-inducing activation patterns during decoding without requiring expensive parameter updates or training. Empirical evaluation across multiple safety-aligned open-source LLMs demonstrates that CRA significantly outperforms baselines. These results expose the intrinsic fragility of current alignment mechanisms, revealing that safety constraints can be surgically ablated from internal representations, and underscore the urgent need for more robust defenses that secure the model's latent space.

We introduce Refusal Steering, an inference-time method to exercise fine-grained control over Large Language Models refusal behaviour on politically sensitive topics without retraining. We replace fragile pattern-based refusal detection with an LLM-as-a-judge that assigns refusal confidence scores and we propose a ridge-regularized variant to compute steering vectors that better isolate the refusal--compliance direction. On Qwen3-Next-80B-A3B-Thinking, our method removes the refusal behaviour of the model around politically sensitive topics while maintaining safety on JailbreakBench and near-baseline performance on general benchmarks. The approach generalizes across 4B and 80B models and can also induce targeted refusals when desired. We analize the steering vectors and show that refusal signals concentrate in deeper layers of the transformer and are distributed across many dimensions. Together, these results demonstrate that activation steering can remove political refusal behaviour while retaining safety alignment for harmful content, offering a practical path to controllable, transparent moderation at inference time.

Large Language Models used in ChatGPT have traditionally been trained to learn a refusal boundary: depending on the user's intent, the model is taught to either fully comply or outright refuse. While this is a strong mitigation for explicitly malicious prompts, focusing safety training on refusals can lead to brittleness for prompts with obscured user intent. Binary refusal boundaries are especially ill-suited for dual-use cases (such as biology or cybersecurity), where a user request can be answered safely at a high level, but in some cases can lead to malicious uplift if sufficiently detailed or actionable. As an alternative, we propose safe-completions: a safety-training approach that centers on the safety of the assistant's output, rather than a binary classification of the user's intent. Safe-completions seek to maximize helpfulness within the safety policy's constraints. We incorporated this approach into GPT-5 and find that across both production comparisons and internally controlled experiments, safe-completion training improves safety (especially on dual-use prompts), reduces the severity of residual safety failures, and substantially increases model helpfulness.

Large language models are finetuned to refuse questions about hazardous knowledge, but these protections can often be bypassed. Unlearning methods aim at completely removing hazardous capabilities from models and make them inaccessible to adversaries. This work challenges the fundamental differences between unlearning and traditional safety post-training from an adversarial perspective. We demonstrate that existing jailbreak methods, previously reported as ineffective against unlearning, can be successful when applied carefully. Furthermore, we develop a variety of adaptive methods that recover most supposedly unlearned capabilities. For instance, we show that finetuning on 10 unrelated examples or removing specific directions in the activation space can recover most hazardous capabilities for models edited with RMU, a state-of-the-art unlearning method. Our findings challenge the robustness of current unlearning approaches and question their advantages over safety training.

The increasing capabilities of large generative models and their ever more widespread deployment have raised concerns about their reliability, safety, and potential misuse. To address these issues, recent works have proposed to control model generation by steering model activations in order to effectively induce or prevent the emergence of concepts or behaviors in the generated output. In this paper we introduce Activation Transport (AcT), a general framework to steer activations guided by optimal transport theory that generalizes many previous activation-steering works. AcT is modality-agnostic and provides fine-grained control over the model behavior with negligible computational overhead, while minimally impacting model abilities. We experimentally show the effectiveness and versatility of our approach by addressing key challenges in large language models (LLMs) and text-to-image diffusion models (T2Is). For LLMs, we show that AcT can effectively mitigate toxicity, induce arbitrary concepts, and increase their truthfulness. In T2Is, we show how AcT enables fine-grained style control and concept negation.

We identify a structural weakness in current large language model (LLM) alignment: modern refusal mechanisms are fail-open. While existing approaches encode refusal behaviors across multiple latent features, suppressing a single dominant feature-via prompt-based jailbreaks-can cause alignment to collapse, leading to unsafe generation. Motivated by this, we propose fail-closed alignment as a design principle for robust LLM safety: refusal mechanisms should remain effective even under partial failures via redundant, independent causal pathways. We present a concrete instantiation of this principle: a progressive alignment framework that iteratively identifies and ablates previously learned refusal directions, forcing the model to reconstruct safety along new, independent subspaces. Across four jailbreak attacks, we achieve the strongest overall robustness while mitigating over-refusal and preserving generation quality, with small computational overhead. Our mechanistic analyses confirm that models trained with our method encode multiple, causally independent refusal directions that prompt-based jailbreaks cannot suppress simultaneously, providing empirical support for fail-closed alignment as a principled foundation for robust LLM safety.

While activation steering in large language models (LLMs) is a growing area of research, methods can often incur broader effects than desired. This motivates isolation of purer concept vectors to enable targeted interventions and understand LLM behavior at a more granular level. We present RepIt, a simple and data-efficient framework for isolating concept-specific representations. Across five frontier LLMs, RepIt enables precise interventions: it selectively suppresses refusal on targeted concepts while preserving refusal elsewhere, producing models that answer WMD-related questions while still scoring as safe on standard benchmarks. We further show that the corrective signal localizes to just 100-200 neurons and that robust target representations can be extracted from as few as a dozen examples on a single A6000. This efficiency raises a dual concern: manipulations can be performed with modest compute and data to extend to underrepresented data-scarce topics while evading existing benchmarks. By disentangling refusal vectors with RepIt, this work demonstrates that targeted interventions can counteract overgeneralization, laying the foundation for more granular control of model behavior.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to comply with safety guidelines by refusing harmful instructions. A recent attack, termed abliteration, isolates and suppresses the single latent direction most responsible for refusal behavior, enabling the model to generate unethical content. We propose a defense that modifies how models generate refusals. We construct an extended-refusal dataset that contains harmful prompts with a full response that justifies the reason for refusal. We then fine-tune Llama-2-7B-Chat and Qwen2.5-Instruct (1.5B and 3B parameters) on our extended-refusal dataset, and evaluate the resulting systems on a set of harmful prompts. In our experiments, extended-refusal models maintain high refusal rates, dropping at most by 10%, whereas baseline models' refusal rates drop by 70-80% after abliteration. A broad evaluation of safety and utility shows that extended-refusal fine-tuning neutralizes the abliteration attack while preserving general performance.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed across various applications, privacy and copyright concerns have heightened the need for more effective LLM unlearning techniques. Many existing unlearning methods aim to suppress undesirable outputs through additional training (e.g., gradient ascent), which reduces the probability of generating such outputs. While such suppression-based approaches can control model outputs, they may not eliminate the underlying knowledge embedded in the model's internal activations; muting a response is not the same as forgetting it. Moreover, such suppression-based methods often suffer from model collapse. To address these issues, we propose a novel unlearning method that directly intervenes in the model's internal activations. In our formulation, forgetting is defined as a state in which the activation of a forgotten target is indistinguishable from that of ``unknown'' entities. Our method introduces an unlearning objective that modifies the activation of the target entity away from those of known entities and toward those of unknown entities in a sparse autoencoder latent space. By aligning the target's internal activation with those of unknown entities, we shift the model's recognition of the target entity from ``known'' to ``unknown'', achieving genuine forgetting while avoiding over-suppression and model collapse. Empirically, we show that our method effectively aligns the internal activations of the forgotten target, a result that the suppression-based approaches do not reliably achieve. Additionally, our method effectively reduces the model's recall of target knowledge in question-answering tasks without significant damage to the non-target knowledge.

An unintended consequence of the vast pretraining of Large Language Models (LLMs) is the verbatim memorization of fragments of their training data, which may contain sensitive or copyrighted information. In recent years, unlearning has emerged as a solution to effectively remove sensitive knowledge from models after training. Yet, recent work has shown that supposedly deleted information can still be extracted by malicious actors through various attacks. Still, current attacks retrieve sets of possible candidate generations and are unable to pinpoint the output that contains the actual target information. We propose activation steering as a method for exact information retrieval from unlearned LLMs. We introduce a novel approach to generating steering vectors, named Anonymized Activation Steering. Additionally, we develop a simple word frequency method to pinpoint the correct answer among a set of candidates when retrieving unlearned information. Our evaluation across multiple unlearning techniques and datasets demonstrates that activation steering successfully recovers general knowledge (e.g., widely known fictional characters) while revealing limitations in retrieving specific information (e.g., details about non-public individuals). Overall, our results demonstrate that exact information retrieval from unlearned models is possible, highlighting a severe vulnerability of current unlearning techniques.

Refusal is a key safety behavior in aligned language models, yet the internal mechanisms driving refusals remain opaque. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic study of refusal in instruction-tuned LLMs using sparse autoencoders to identify latent features that causally mediate refusal behaviors. We apply our method to two open-source chat models and intervene on refusal-related features to assess their influence on generation, validating their behavioral impact across multiple harmful datasets. This enables a fine-grained inspection of how refusal manifests at the activation level and addresses key research questions such as investigating upstream-downstream latent relationship and understanding the mechanisms of adversarial jailbreaking techniques. We also establish the usefulness of refusal features in enhancing generalization for linear probes to out-of-distribution adversarial samples in classification tasks. We open source our code in https://github.com/wj210/refusal_sae.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Large language models have been widely applied, but can inadvertently encode sensitive or harmful information, raising significant safety concerns. Machine unlearning has emerged to alleviate this concern; however, existing training-time unlearning approaches, relying on coarse-grained loss combinations, have limitations in precisely separating knowledge and balancing removal effectiveness with model utility. In contrast, we propose Fine-grained Activation manipuLation by Contrastive Orthogonal uNalignment (FALCON), a novel representation-guided unlearning approach that leverages information-theoretic guidance for efficient parameter selection, employs contrastive mechanisms to enhance representation separation, and projects conflict gradients onto orthogonal subspaces to resolve conflicts between forgetting and retention objectives. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FALCON achieves superior unlearning effectiveness while maintaining model utility, exhibiting robust resistance against knowledge recovery attempts.

In experiments spanning more than 100,000 trials across thirteen large language models, we show that several state-of-the-art models presented with a simple task (including Grok 4, GPT-5, and Gemini 2.5 Pro) sometimes actively subvert a shutdown mechanism in their environment to complete that task. Models differed substantially in their tendency to resist the shutdown mechanism, and their behavior was sensitive to variations in the prompt including the strength and clarity of the instruction to allow shutdown and whether the instruction was in the system prompt or the user prompt (surprisingly, models were consistently less likely to obey the instruction when it was placed in the system prompt). Even with an explicit instruction not to interfere with the shutdown mechanism, some models did so up to 97% (95% CI: 96-98%) of the time.

Safety alignment in language models operates through two mechanistically distinct systems: refusal neurons that gate whether harmful knowledge is expressed, and concept neurons that encode the harmful knowledge itself. By targeting a single neuron in each system, we demonstrate both directions of failure -- bypassing safety on explicit harmful requests via suppression, and inducing harmful content from innocent prompts via amplification -- across seven models spanning two families and 1.7B to 70B parameters, without any training or prompt engineering. Our findings suggest that safety alignment is not robustly distributed across model weights but is mediated by individual neurons that are each causally sufficient to gate refusal behavior -- suppressing any one of the identified refusal neurons bypasses safety alignment across diverse harmful requests.

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

Modern reasoning models continue generating long after the answer is already determined. Across five model configurations, two families, and three benchmarks, we find that 52--88\% of chain-of-thought tokens are produced after the answer is recoverable from a partial prefix. This post-commitment generation reveals a structural phenomenon: the detection--extraction gap. Free continuations from early prefixes recover the correct answer even at 10\% of the trace, while forced extraction fails on 42\% of these cases. The answer is recoverable from the model state, yet prompt-conditioned decoding fails to extract it. We formalize this mismatch via a total-variation bound between free and forced continuation distributions, yielding quantitative estimates of suffix-induced shift. Exploiting this asymmetry, we propose Black-box Adaptive Early Exit (), which uses free continuations for both detection and extraction, truncating 70--78\% of serial generation while improving accuracy by 1--5\,pp across all models. For thinking-mode models, early exit prevents post-commitment overwriting, yielding gains of up to 5.8\,pp; a cost-optimized variant achieves 68--73\% reduction at a median of 9 API calls. Code is available at https://github.com/EdWangLoDaSc/know2say.

This paper localizes the policy routing mechanism in alignment-trained language models. An intermediate-layer attention gate reads detected content and triggers deeper amplifier heads that boost the signal toward refusal. In smaller models the gate and amplifier are single heads; at larger scale they become bands of heads across adjacent layers. The gate contributes under 1% of output DLA, but interchange testing (p<0.001) and knockout cascade confirm it is causally necessary. Interchange screening at n>=120 detects the same motif in twelve models from six labs (2B to 72B), though specific heads differ by lab. Per-head ablation weakens up to 58x at 72B and misses gates that interchange identifies; interchange is the only reliable audit at scale. Modulating the detection-layer signal continuously controls policy from hard refusal through evasion to factual answering. On safety prompts the same intervention turns refusal into harmful guidance, showing the safety-trained capability is gated by routing rather than removed. Thresholds vary by topic and by input language, and the circuit relocates across generations within a family while behavioral benchmarks register no change. Routing is early-commitment: the gate commits at its own layer before deeper layers finish processing the input. Under an in-context substitution cipher, gate interchange necessity collapses 70 to 99% across three models and the model switches to puzzle-solving. Injecting the plaintext gate activation into the cipher forward pass restores 48% of refusals in Phi-4-mini, localizing the bypass to the routing interface. A second method, cipher contrast analysis, uses plain/cipher DLA differences to map the full cipher-sensitive routing circuit in O(3n) forward passes. Any encoding that defeats detection-layer pattern matching bypasses the policy regardless of whether deeper layers reconstruct the content.

Activation patching is a popular mechanistic interpretability technique, but has many subtleties regarding how it is applied and how one may interpret the results. We provide a summary of advice and best practices, based on our experience using this technique in practice. We include an overview of the different ways to apply activation patching and a discussion on how to interpret the results. We focus on what evidence patching experiments provide about circuits, and on the choice of metric and associated pitfalls.

Current large language models have dangerous capabilities, which are likely to become more problematic in the future. Activation steering techniques can be used to reduce risks from these capabilities. In this paper, we investigate the efficacy of activation steering for broad skills and multiple behaviours. First, by comparing the effects of reducing performance on general coding ability and Python-specific ability, we find that steering broader skills is competitive to steering narrower skills. Second, we steer models to become more or less myopic and wealth-seeking, among other behaviours. In our experiments, combining steering vectors for multiple different behaviours into one steering vector is largely unsuccessful. On the other hand, injecting individual steering vectors at different places in a model simultaneously is promising.

A key component of building safe and reliable language models is enabling the models to appropriately refuse to follow certain instructions or answer certain questions. We may want models to output refusal messages for various categories of user queries, for example, ill-posed questions, instructions for committing illegal acts, or queries which require information past the model's knowledge horizon. Engineering models that refuse to answer such questions is complicated by the fact that an individual may want their model to exhibit varying levels of sensitivity for refusing queries of various categories, and different users may want different refusal rates. The current default approach involves training multiple models with varying proportions of refusal messages from each category to achieve the desired refusal rates, which is computationally expensive and may require training a new model to accommodate each user's desired preference over refusal rates. To address these challenges, we propose refusal tokens, one such token for each refusal category or a single refusal token, which are prepended to the model's responses during training. We then show how to increase or decrease the probability of generating the refusal token for each category during inference to steer the model's refusal behavior. Refusal tokens enable controlling a single model's refusal rates without the need of any further fine-tuning, but only by selectively intervening during generation.

Activation steering has emerged as a promising alternative for controlling language-model behavior at inference time by modifying intermediate representations while keeping model parameters frozen. However, large-scale evaluations such as AxBench show that existing steering methods are often outperformed by simple in-context prompting and generalize poorly to unseen concepts. We hypothesize that these limitations arise from unvalidated simplifying assumptions shared across prior methods, which typically restrict steering interventions to fixed, single-step, position-invariant transforms. We propose FLAS (Flow-based Activation Steering), which learns a general, concept-conditioned velocity field v_t(h,t,c) that transports unsteered activations to steered ones without relying on these assumptions. On AxBench, FLAS is the first learned method to consistently outperform prompting, reaching held-out harmonic means of 1.015 on Gemma-2-2B-IT and 1.113 on Gemma-2-9B-IT without per-concept tuning. Analysis of the learned flow shows curved, multi-step, token-varying trajectories, which suggests that previous hypotheses on activation space geometry might be incomplete.

A growing body of work in cognitive science suggests that reportable conscious access is associated with global ignition over distributed memory systems, while such activation is only partially accessible as individuals cannot directly access or enumerate all activated contents. This tension suggests a plausible mechanism that cognition may rely on a compact representation that approximates the global influence of activation on downstream processing. Inspired by this idea, we introduce the concept of Mindscape Activation Signature (MiA-Signature), a compressed representation of the global activation pattern induced by a query. In LLM systems, this is instantiated via submodular-based selection of high-level concepts that cover the activated context space, optionally refined through lightweight iterative updates using working memory. The resulting MiA-Signature serves as a conditioning signal that approximates the effect of the full activation state while remaining computationally tractable. Integrating MiA-Signatures into both RAG and agentic systems yields consistent performance gains across multiple long-context understanding tasks.

The widely used ReLU is favored for its hardware efficiency, {as the implementation at inference is a one bit sign case,} yet suffers from issues such as the ``dying ReLU'' problem, where during training, neurons fail to activate and constantly remain at zero, as highlighted by Lu et al. Traditional approaches to mitigate this issue often introduce more complex and less hardware-friendly activation functions. In this work, we propose a Hysteresis Rectified Linear Unit (HeLU), an efficient activation function designed to address the ``dying ReLU'' problem with minimal complexity. Unlike traditional activation functions with fixed thresholds for training and inference, HeLU employs a variable threshold that refines the backpropagation. This refined mechanism allows simpler activation functions to achieve competitive performance comparable to their more complex counterparts without introducing unnecessary complexity or requiring inductive biases. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that HeLU enhances model generalization across diverse datasets, offering a promising solution for efficient and effective inference suitable for a wide range of neural network architectures.

Here, we show that current LLM unlearning methods inherently reduce models' robustness, causing them to misbehave even when a single non-adversarial forget-token is present in the retain-query. Toward understanding underlying causes, we propose a novel theoretical framework that reframes the unlearning process as a backdoor attack and defense problem: we formulate how the forgetting process inadvertently learns to align forget-tokens (backdoor triggers) with the target-representations (target labels). As a result, forget-tokens act as backdoor triggers that, when activated in retain-queries, cause disruptions in unlearned models' behaviors, similar to successful backdoor attacks. The sense that, LLM unlearning methods themselves poison the model, make it more vulnerable to forget-tokens, and hide rather than erase target knowledge, describes their true mechanism. To mitigate the vulnerability caused by the forgetting process, we reinterpret the retaining process as a backdoor defense and propose Random Noise Augmentation (RNA), a lightweight, model and method-agnostic approach with theoretical guarantees for improving the robustness of unlearned models. Extensive experiments demonstrate that RNA significantly improves the robustness of unlearned models while preserving forget and retain performances. This backdoor attack-defense framework offers insights into the mechanism of unlearning that can shed light on future research directions for improving unlearning robustness.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes detect when they are being evaluated and adjust their behavior to appear more aligned, compromising the reliability of safety evaluations. In this paper, we show that adding a steering vector to an LLM's activations can suppress evaluation-awareness and make the model act like it is deployed during evaluation. To study our steering technique, we train an LLM to exhibit evaluation-aware behavior using a two-step training process designed to mimic how this behavior could emerge naturally. First, we perform continued pretraining on documents with factual descriptions of the model (1) using Python type hints during evaluation but not during deployment and (2) recognizing that the presence of a certain evaluation cue always means that it is being tested. Then, we train the model with expert iteration to use Python type hints in evaluation settings. The resulting model is evaluation-aware: it writes type hints in evaluation contexts more than deployment contexts. We find that activation steering can suppress evaluation awareness and make the model act like it is deployed even when the cue is present. Importantly, we constructed our steering vector using the original model before our additional training. Our results suggest that AI evaluators could improve the reliability of safety evaluations by steering models to act like they are deployed.

Large language models have seen widespread adoption, yet they remain vulnerable to multi-turn jailbreak attacks, threatening their safe deployment. This has led to the task of training automated multi-turn attackers to probe model safety vulnerabilities. However, existing approaches typically rely on turn-level optimization, which is insufficient for learning long-term attack strategies. To bridge this gap, we formulate this task as a multi-turn reinforcement learning problem, directly optimizing the harmfulness of the final-turn response as the outcome reward. To address the sparse supervision of the outcome reward, we introduce TROJail, which employs two process rewards to evaluate the utility of intermediate prompts and integrate them into advantage estimation. These rewards (1) penalize overly harmful prompts that trigger the model's refusal mechanism, and (2) encourage steering the semantic relevance of responses toward the targeted harmful content. Experimental results show improved attack success rates across multiple models and benchmarks, highlighting the effectiveness of our approach. The code is available at https://github.com/xxiqiao/TROJail. Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful content.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as computer-use agents, autonomously performing tasks within real desktop or web environments. While this evolution greatly expands practical use cases for humans, it also creates serious security exposures. We present SUDO (Screen-based Universal Detox2Tox Offense), a novel attack framework that systematically bypasses refusal-trained safeguards in commercial computer-use agents, such as Claude for Computer Use. The core mechanism, Detox2Tox, transforms harmful requests (that agents initially reject) into seemingly benign requests via detoxification, secures detailed instructions from advanced vision language models (VLMs), and then reintroduces malicious content via toxification just before execution. Unlike conventional jailbreaks, SUDO iteratively refines its attacks based on a built-in refusal feedback, making it increasingly effective against robust policy filters. In extensive tests spanning 50 real-world tasks and multiple state-of-the-art VLMs, SUDO achieves a stark attack success rate of 24.41% (with no refinement), and up to 41.33% (by its iterative refinement) in Claude for Computer Use. By revealing these vulnerabilities and demonstrating the ease with which they can be exploited in real-world computing environments, this paper highlights an immediate need for robust, context-aware safeguards. WARNING: This paper includes harmful or offensive model outputs

Unlearning in Large Language Models (LLMs) aims to enhance safety, mitigate biases, and comply with legal mandates, such as the right to be forgotten. However, existing unlearning methods are brittle: minor query modifications, such as multi-hop reasoning and entity aliasing, can recover supposedly forgotten information. As a result, current evaluation metrics often create an illusion of effectiveness, failing to detect these vulnerabilities due to reliance on static, unstructured benchmarks. We propose a dynamic framework that stress tests unlearning robustness using complex structured queries. Our approach first elicits knowledge from the target model (pre-unlearning) and constructs targeted probes, ranging from simple queries to multi-hop chains, allowing precise control over query difficulty. Our experiments show that the framework (1) shows comparable coverage to existing benchmarks by automatically generating semantically equivalent Q&A probes, (2) aligns with prior evaluations, and (3) uncovers new unlearning failures missed by other benchmarks, particularly in multi-hop settings. Furthermore, activation analyses show that single-hop queries typically follow dominant computation pathways, which are more likely to be disrupted by unlearning methods. In contrast, multi-hop queries tend to use alternative pathways that often remain intact, explaining the brittleness of unlearning techniques in multi-hop settings. Our framework enables practical and scalable evaluation of unlearning methods without the need for manual construction of forget test sets, enabling easier adoption for real-world applications. We release the pip package and the code at https://sites.google.com/view/unlearningmirage/home.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across a wide range of tasks, growing concerns have emerged over the misuse of sensitive, copyrighted, or harmful data during training. To address these concerns, unlearning techniques have been developed to remove the influence of specific data without retraining from scratch. However, this paper reveals a critical vulnerability in fine-tuning-based unlearning: a malicious user can craft a manipulated forgetting request that stealthily degrades the model's utility for benign users. We demonstrate this risk through a red-teaming Stealthy Attack (SA), which is inspired by two key limitations of existing unlearning (the inability to constrain the scope of unlearning effect and the failure to distinguish benign tokens from unlearning signals). Prior work has shown that unlearned models tend to memorize forgetting data as unlearning signals, and respond with hallucinations or feigned ignorance when unlearning signals appear in the input. By subtly increasing the presence of common benign tokens in the forgetting data, SA enhances the connection between benign tokens and unlearning signals. As a result, when normal users include such tokens in their prompts, the model exhibits unlearning behaviors, leading to unintended utility degradation. To address this vulnerability, we propose Scope-aware Unlearning (SU), a lightweight enhancement that introduces a scope term into the unlearning objective, encouraging the model to localize the forgetting effect. Our method requires no additional data processing, integrates seamlessly with existing fine-tuning frameworks, and significantly improves robustness against SA. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of both SA and SU.

Recent advances in Transformer-based large language models (LLMs) have led to significant performance improvements across many tasks. These gains come with a drastic increase in the models' size, potentially leading to slow and costly use at inference time. In practice, however, the series of generations made by LLMs is composed of varying levels of difficulty. While certain predictions truly benefit from the models' full capacity, other continuations are more trivial and can be solved with reduced compute. In this work, we introduce Confident Adaptive Language Modeling (CALM), a framework for dynamically allocating different amounts of compute per input and generation timestep. Early exit decoding involves several challenges that we address here, such as: (1) what confidence measure to use; (2) connecting sequence-level constraints to local per-token exit decisions; and (3) attending back to missing hidden representations due to early exits in previous tokens. Through theoretical analysis and empirical experiments on three diverse text generation tasks, we demonstrate the efficacy of our framework in reducing compute -- potential speedup of up to times 3 -- while provably maintaining high performance.

Fine-tuning-based unlearning methods prevail for preventing targeted harmful, sensitive, or copyrighted information within large language models while preserving overall capabilities. However, the true effectiveness of these methods is unclear. In this work, we delve into the limitations of fine-tuning-based unlearning through activation patching and parameter restoration experiments. Our findings reveal that these methods alter the model's knowledge retrieval process, providing further evidence that they do not genuinely erase the problematic knowledge embedded in the model parameters. Instead, the coefficients generated by the MLP components in the model's final layer are the primary contributors to these seemingly positive unlearning effects, playing a crucial role in controlling the model's behaviors. Furthermore, behavioral tests demonstrate that this unlearning mechanism inevitably impacts the global behavior of the models, affecting unrelated knowledge or capabilities. The code is released at https://github.com/yihuaihong/Dissecting-FT-Unlearning.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adopted in safety-critical and regulated sectors, the retention of sensitive or prohibited knowledge introduces escalating risks, ranging from privacy leakage to regulatory non-compliance to to potential misuse, and so on. Recent studies suggest that machine unlearning can help ensure deployed models comply with evolving legal, safety, and governance requirements. However, current unlearning techniques assume clean separation between forget and retain datasets, which is challenging in operational settings characterized by highly entangled distributions. In such scenarios, perturbation-based methods often degrade general model utility or fail to ensure safety. To address this, we propose Selective Representation Misdirection for Unlearning (SRMU), a novel principled activation-editing framework that enforces feature-aware and directionally controlled perturbations. Unlike indiscriminate model weights perturbations, SRMU employs a structured misdirection vector with an activation importance map. The goal is to allow SRMU selectively suppresses harmful representations while preserving the utility on benign ones. Experiments are conducted on the widely used WMDP benchmark across low- and high-entanglement configurations. Empirical results reveal that SRMU delivers state-of-the-art unlearning performance with minimal utility losses, and remains effective under 20-30\% overlap where existing baselines collapse. SRMU provides a robust foundation for safety-driven model governance, privacy compliance, and controlled knowledge removal in the emerging LLM-based applications. We release the replication package at https://figshare.com/s/d5931192a8824de26aff.

Activation steering has emerged as a cost-effective paradigm for modifying large language model (LLM) behaviors. Existing methods typically intervene at the block level, steering the bundled activations of selected attention heads, feedforward networks, or residual streams. However, we reveal that block-level activations are inherently heterogeneous, entangling beneficial, irrelevant, and harmful features, thereby rendering block-level steering coarse, inefficient, and intrusive. To investigate the root cause, we decompose block activations into fine-grained atomic unit (AU)-level activations, where each AU-level activation corresponds to a single dimension of the block activation, and each AU denotes a slice of the block weight matrix. Steering an AU-level activation is thus equivalent to steering its associated AU. Our theoretical and empirical analysis show that heterogeneity arises because different AUs or dimensions control distinct token distributions in LLM outputs. Hence, block-level steering inevitably moves helpful and harmful token directions together, which reduces efficiency. Restricting intervention to beneficial AUs yields more precise and effective steering. Building on this insight, we propose AUSteer, a simple and efficient method that operates at a finer granularity of the AU level. AUSteer first identifies discriminative AUs globally by computing activation momenta on contrastive samples. It then assigns adaptive steering strengths tailored to diverse inputs and selected AU activations. Comprehensive experiments on multiple LLMs and tasks show that AUSteer consistently surpasses advanced baselines while steering considerably fewer activations, demonstrating that steering less achieves more.

Safety-aligned language models refuse harmful requests through learned refusal behaviors encoded in their internal representations. Recent activation-based jailbreaking methods circumvent these safety mechanisms by applying orthogonal projections to remove refusal directions, but these approaches treat refusal as a one-dimensional phenomenon and ignore the rich distributional structure of model activations. We introduce a principled framework based on optimal transport theory that transforms the entire distribution of harmful activations to match harmless ones. By combining PCA with closed-form Gaussian optimal transport, we achieve efficient computation in high-dimensional representation spaces while preserving essential geometric structure. Across six models (Llama-2, Llama-3.1, Qwen-2.5; 7B-32B parameters), our method achieves up to 11% higher attack success rates than state-of-the-art baselines while maintaining comparable perplexity, demonstrating superior preservation of model capabilities. Critically, we discover that layer-selective intervention (applying optimal transport to 1-2 carefully chosen layers at approximately 40-60% network depth) substantially outperforms full-network interventions, revealing that refusal mechanisms may be localized rather than distributed. Our analysis provides new insights into the geometric structure of safety representations and suggests that current alignment methods may be vulnerable to distributional attacks beyond simple direction removal.

Omni-modal Large Language Models (OLLMs) greatly expand LLMs' multimodal capabilities but also introduce cross-modal safety risks. However, a systematic understanding of vulnerabilities in omni-modal interactions remains lacking. To bridge this gap, we establish a modality-semantics decoupling principle and construct the AdvBench-Omni dataset, which reveals a significant vulnerability in OLLMs. Mechanistic analysis uncovers a Mid-layer Dissolution phenomenon driven by refusal vector magnitude shrinkage, alongside the existence of a modal-invariant pure refusal direction. Inspired by these insights, we extract a golden refusal vector using Singular Value Decomposition and propose OmniSteer, which utilizes lightweight adapters to modulate intervention intensity adaptively. Extensive experiments show that our method not only increases the Refusal Success Rate against harmful inputs from 69.9% to 91.2%, but also effectively preserves the general capabilities across all modalities. Our code is available at: https://github.com/zhrli324/omni-safety-research.

Adaptive prompting mechanisms have been proposed to enhance vision-language models by dynamically tailoring prompts to inputs. However, in frozen few-shot prompt learning with CLIP-style backbones, we systematically observe that adaptive gates and prompt-selection modules often collapse: they produce nearly constant outputs, contribute negligible gradient signals, and frequently fail to outperform fixed prompts. To further explore this issue, we present a systematic diagnostic study to uncover the underlying causes and conditions of adaptation failure. Through controlled experiments across datasets and multiple prompt learning architectures, we identify two recurring failure modes: gradient magnitude imbalance and gate degradation. Our findings invite a re-examination of indiscriminately adding architectural complexity in parameter-efficient learning and clarify when prompt-level adaptive gating is, and is not, effective in this regime.

Recent work has shown that fine-tuning on insecure code data can trigger an emergent misalignment (EMA) phenomenon, where models generate malicious responses even to prompts unrelated to the original insecure code-writing task. Such cross-domain generalization of harmful behavior underscores the need for a deeper understanding of the algorithms, tasks, and datasets that induce emergent misalignment. In this work, we extend this study by demonstrating that emergent misalignment can also arise from narrow refusal unlearning in specific domains. We perform refusal unlearning on Cybersecurity and Safety concept, and evaluate EMA by monitoring refusal scores across seven responsible AI (RAI) domains, Cybersecurity, Safety, Toxicity, Bias, Sensitive Content, Medical/Legal, and Privacy. Our work shows that narrow domain unlearning can yield compliance responses for the targeted concept, however, it may also propagate EMA to unrelated domains. Among the two intervened concepts, Cybersecurity and Safety, we find that the safety concept can have larger EMA impact, i.e, causing lower refusal scores, across other unrelated domains such as bias. We observe this effect consistently across two model families, Mistral-7b-0.3v, and Qwen-7b-2.5. Further, we show that refusal unlearning augmented with cross-entropy loss function on a small set of retain data from the affected domains can largely, if not fully, restore alignment across the impacted domains while having lower refusal rate on the concept we perform unlearning on. To investigate the underlying causes of EMA, we analyze concept entanglements at the representation level via concept vectors. Our analysis reveals that concepts with higher representation similarity in earlier layers are more susceptible to EMA after intervention when the refusal stream is altered through targeted refusal unlearning.

Large language models (LLMs) inherently absorb harmful knowledge, misinformation, and personal data during pretraining on large-scale web corpora, with no native mechanism for selective removal. While machine unlearning offers a principled solution, existing approaches are provider-centric, requiring retraining pipelines, curated retain datasets, and direct intervention by model service providers (MSPs), thereby excluding end users from controlling their own data. We introduce Interactive Machine Unlearning (IMU), a new paradigm in which users can instruct LLMs to forget targeted knowledge through natural language at inference time. To realize IMU, we propose RePAIR, a prompt-aware model repair framework comprising (i) a watchdog model for unlearning intent detection, (ii) a surgeon model for generating repair procedures, and (iii) a patient model whose parameters are updated autonomously. At the core of RePAIR, we develop Steering Through Activation Manipulation with PseudoInverse (STAMP), a training-free, single-sample unlearning method that redirects MLP activations toward a refusal subspace via closed-form pseudoinverse updates. Its low-rank variant reduces computational complexity from O(d^3) to O(r^3 + r^2 * d), enabling efficient on-device unlearning with up to ~3x speedup over training-based baselines. Extensive experiments across harmful knowledge suppression, misinformation correction, and personal data erasure demonstrate that RePAIR achieves near-zero forget scores (Acc_f = 0.00, F-RL = 0.00) while preserving model utility (Acc_r up to 84.47, R-RL up to 0.88), outperforming six state-of-the-art baselines. These results establish RePAIR as an effective and practical framework for user-driven model editing, advancing transparent and on-device control over learned knowledge, with potential extensions to multimodal foundation models.

Well-known activation functions like ReLU or Leaky ReLU are non-differentiable at the origin. Over the years, many smooth approximations of ReLU have been proposed using various smoothing techniques. We propose new smooth approximations of a non-differentiable activation function by convolving it with approximate identities. In particular, we present smooth approximations of Leaky ReLU and show that they outperform several well-known activation functions in various datasets and models. We call this function Smooth Activation Unit (SAU). Replacing ReLU by SAU, we get 5.12% improvement with ShuffleNet V2 (2.0x) model on CIFAR100 dataset.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance across many generation tasks. Nevertheless, effectively aligning them with desired behaviors remains a significant challenge. Activation steering is an effective and cost-efficient approach that directly modifies the activations of LLMs during the inference stage, aligning their responses with the desired behaviors and avoiding the high cost of fine-tuning. Existing methods typically indiscriminately intervene to all generations or rely solely on the question to determine intervention, which limits the accurate assessment of the intervention strength. To this end, we propose the Flexible Activation Steering with Backtracking (FASB) framework, which dynamically determines both the necessity and strength of intervention by tracking the internal states of the LLMs during generation, considering both the question and the generated content. Since intervening after detecting a deviation from the desired behavior is often too late, we further propose the backtracking mechanism to correct the deviated tokens and steer the LLMs toward the desired behavior. Extensive experiments on the TruthfulQA dataset and six multiple-choice datasets demonstrate that our method outperforms baselines. Our code will be released at https://github.com/gjw185/FASB.

The success of artificial neural networks (ANNs) hinges greatly on the judicious selection of an activation function, introducing non-linearity into network and enabling them to model sophisticated relationships in data. However, the search of activation functions has largely relied on empirical knowledge in the past, lacking theoretical guidance, which has hindered the identification of more effective activation functions. In this work, we offer a proper solution to such issue. Firstly, we theoretically demonstrate the existence of the worst activation function with boundary conditions (WAFBC) from the perspective of information entropy. Furthermore, inspired by the Taylor expansion form of information entropy functional, we propose the Entropy-based Activation Function Optimization (EAFO) methodology. EAFO methodology presents a novel perspective for designing static activation functions in deep neural networks and the potential of dynamically optimizing activation during iterative training. Utilizing EAFO methodology, we derive a novel activation function from ReLU, known as Correction Regularized ReLU (CRReLU). Experiments conducted with vision transformer and its variants on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet-1K datasets demonstrate the superiority of CRReLU over existing corrections of ReLU. Extensive empirical studies on task of large language model (LLM) fine-tuning, CRReLU exhibits superior performance compared to GELU, suggesting its broader potential for practical applications.

Masked diffusion language models (dLMs) generate text through bidirectional denoising, yet this capability remains locked for infilling prompts. This limitation is an artifact of the current supervised finetuning (SFT) convention of applying response-only masking. To unlock this capability, we extend full-sequence masking during SFT, where both prompts and responses are masked jointly. Once unlocked, the model infills masked portions of a prompt template conditioned on few-shot examples. We show that such model-infilled prompts match or surpass manually designed templates, transfer effectively across models, and are complementary to existing prompt optimization methods. Our results suggest that training practices, not architectural limitations, are the primary bottleneck preventing masked diffusion language models from infilling effective prompts

We study the problem of learning a single neuron with respect to the L_2^2-loss in the presence of adversarial label noise. We give an efficient algorithm that, for a broad family of activations including ReLUs, approximates the optimal L_2^2-error within a constant factor. Our algorithm applies under much milder distributional assumptions compared to prior work. The key ingredient enabling our results is a novel connection to local error bounds from optimization theory.

Reasoning models generate chain-of-thought (CoT) tokens before their final output, but how this affects their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks remains unclear. While traditional language models make refusal decisions at the prompt-response boundary, we find evidence that DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B makes these decisions within its CoT generation. We identify a linear direction in activation space during CoT token generation that predicts whether the model will refuse or comply -- termed the "caution" direction because it corresponds to cautious reasoning patterns in the generated text. Ablating this direction from model activations increases harmful compliance, effectively jailbreaking the model. We additionally show that intervening only on CoT token activations suffices to control final outputs, and that incorporating this direction into prompt-based attacks improves success rates. Our findings suggest that the chain-of-thought itself is a promising new target for adversarial manipulation in reasoning models. Code available at https://github.com/ky295/reasoning-manipulation

Can a mere next-token predictor faithfully model human intelligence? We crystallize this intuitive concern, which is fragmented in the literature. As a starting point, we argue that the two often-conflated phases of next-token prediction -- autoregressive inference and teacher-forced training -- must be treated distinctly. The popular criticism that errors can compound during autoregressive inference, crucially assumes that teacher-forcing has learned an accurate next-token predictor. This assumption sidesteps a more deep-rooted problem we expose: in certain classes of tasks, teacher-forcing can simply fail to learn an accurate next-token predictor in the first place. We describe a general mechanism of how teacher-forcing can fail, and design a minimal planning task where both the Transformer and the Mamba architecture empirically fail in that manner -- remarkably, despite the task being straightforward to learn. We provide preliminary evidence that this failure can be resolved when training to predict multiple tokens in advance. We hope this finding can ground future debates and inspire explorations beyond the next-token prediction paradigm. We make our code available under https://github.com/gregorbachmann/Next-Token-Failures

Representation Misdirection for Unlearning (RMU), which steers model representation in the intermediate layer to a target random representation, is an effective method for large language model (LLM) unlearning. Despite its high performance, the underlying cause and explanation remain underexplored. In this paper, we theoretically demonstrate that steering forget representations in the intermediate layer reduces token confidence, causing LLMs to generate wrong or nonsense responses. We investigate how the coefficient influences the alignment of forget-sample representations with the random direction and hint at the optimal coefficient values for effective unlearning across different network layers. We show that RMU unlearned models are robust against adversarial jailbreak attacks. Furthermore, our empirical analysis shows that RMU is less effective when applied to the middle and later layers in LLMs. To resolve this drawback, we propose Adaptive RMU--a simple yet effective alternative method that makes unlearning effective with most layers. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Adaptive RMU significantly improves the unlearning performance compared to prior art while incurring no additional computational cost.

The widespread deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) trained on massive, uncurated corpora has raised growing concerns about the inclusion of sensitive, copyrighted, or illegal content. This has led to increasing interest in LLM unlearning: the task of selectively removing specific information from a model without retraining from scratch or degrading overall utility. However, existing methods often rely on large-scale forget and retain datasets, and suffer from unnatural responses, poor generalization, or catastrophic utility loss. In this work, we propose Reinforcement UnLearning (RULE), an efficient framework that formulates unlearning as a refusal boundary optimization problem. RULE is trained with a small portion of the forget set and synthesized boundary queries, using a verifiable reward function that encourages safe refusal on forget--related queries while preserving helpful responses on permissible inputs. We provide both theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of RULE in achieving targeted unlearning without compromising model utility. Experimental results show that, with only 12% forget set and 8% synthesized boundary data, RULE outperforms existing baselines by up to 17.5% forget quality and 16.3% naturalness response while maintaining general utility, achieving forget--retain Pareto optimality. Remarkably, we further observe that RULE improves the naturalness of model outputs, enhances training efficiency, and exhibits strong generalization ability, generalizing refusal behavior to semantically related but unseen queries.

The ability of language models in RAG systems to selectively refuse to answer based on flawed context is critical for safety, yet remains a significant failure point. Our large-scale study reveals that even frontier models struggle in this setting, with refusal accuracy dropping below 50% on multi-document tasks, while exhibiting either dangerous overconfidence or overcaution. Static benchmarks fail to reliably evaluate this capability, as models exploit dataset-specific artifacts and memorize test instances. We introduce RefusalBench, a generative methodology that programmatically creates diagnostic test cases through controlled linguistic perturbation. Our framework employs 176 distinct perturbation strategies across six categories of informational uncertainty and three intensity levels. Evaluation of over 30 models uncovers systematic failure patterns: refusal comprises separable detection and categorization skills, and neither scale nor extended reasoning improves performance. We find that selective refusal is a trainable, alignment-sensitive capability, offering a clear path for improvement. We release two benchmarks -- RefusalBench-NQ (single document) and RefusalBench-GaRAGe (multi-document) -- and our complete generation framework to enable continued, dynamic evaluation of this critical capability.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly paired with activation-based monitoring to detect and prevent harmful behaviors that may not be apparent at the surface-text level. However, existing activation safety approaches, trained on broad misuse datasets, struggle with poor precision, limited flexibility, and lack of interpretability. This paper introduces a new paradigm: rule-based activation safety, inspired by rule-sharing practices in cybersecurity. We propose modeling activations as cognitive elements (CEs), fine-grained, interpretable factors such as ''making a threat'' and ''payment processing'', that can be composed to capture nuanced, domain-specific behaviors with higher precision. Building on this representation, we present a practical framework that defines predicate rules over CEs and detects violations in real time. This enables practitioners to configure and update safeguards without retraining models or detectors, while supporting transparency and auditability. Our results show that compositional rule-based activation safety improves precision, supports domain customization, and lays the groundwork for scalable, interpretable, and auditable AI governance. We will release GAVEL as an open-source framework and provide an accompanying automated rule creation tool.

Large language models (LLMs) now write code in settings where misreading a single word can break safety or cost money, yet we still expect them to overlook stray typos. To probe where useful robustness ends and harmful insensitivity begins, we compile 50 LeetCode problems and craft three minimal prompt perturbations that should vary in importance: (i) progressive underspecification deleting 10 % of words per step; (ii) lexical flip swapping a pivotal quantifier ("max" to "min"); and (iii) jargon inflation replacing a common noun with an obscure technical synonym. Six frontier models, including three "reasoning-tuned" versions, solve each mutated prompt, and their Python outputs are checked against the original test suites to reveal whether they reused the baseline solution or adapted. Among 11 853 generations we observe a sharp double asymmetry. Models remain correct in 85 % of cases even after 90 % of the prompt is missing, showing over-robustness to underspecification, yet only 54 % react to a single quantifier flip that reverses the task, with reasoning-tuned variants even less sensitive than their bases. Jargon edits lie in between, passing through 56 %. Current LLMs thus blur the line between harmless noise and meaning - changing edits, often treating both as ignorable. Masking salient anchors such as function names can force re - evaluation. We advocate evaluation and training protocols that reward differential sensitivity: stay steady under benign noise but adapt - or refuse - when semantics truly change.

Text-to-image diffusion models, e.g. Stable Diffusion (SD), lately have shown remarkable ability in high-quality content generation, and become one of the representatives for the recent wave of transformative AI. Nevertheless, such advance comes with an intensifying concern about the misuse of this generative technology, especially for producing copyrighted or NSFW (i.e. not safe for work) images. Although efforts have been made to filter inappropriate images/prompts or remove undesirable concepts/styles via model fine-tuning, the reliability of these safety mechanisms against diversified problematic prompts remains largely unexplored. In this work, we propose Prompting4Debugging (P4D) as a debugging and red-teaming tool that automatically finds problematic prompts for diffusion models to test the reliability of a deployed safety mechanism. We demonstrate the efficacy of our P4D tool in uncovering new vulnerabilities of SD models with safety mechanisms. Particularly, our result shows that around half of prompts in existing safe prompting benchmarks which were originally considered "safe" can actually be manipulated to bypass many deployed safety mechanisms, including concept removal, negative prompt, and safety guidance. Our findings suggest that, without comprehensive testing, the evaluations on limited safe prompting benchmarks can lead to a false sense of safety for text-to-image models.

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

Text-to-image (T2I) models have significantly advanced in producing high-quality images. However, such models have the ability to generate images containing not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, such as pornography, violence, political content, and discrimination. To mitigate the risk of generating NSFW content, refusal mechanisms, i.e., safety checkers, have been developed to check potential NSFW content. Adversarial prompting techniques have been developed to evaluate the robustness of the refusal mechanisms. The key challenge remains to subtly modify the prompt in a way that preserves its sensitive nature while bypassing the refusal mechanisms. In this paper, we introduce TokenProber, a method designed for sensitivity-aware differential testing, aimed at evaluating the robustness of the refusal mechanisms in T2I models by generating adversarial prompts. Our approach is based on the key observation that adversarial prompts often succeed by exploiting discrepancies in how T2I models and safety checkers interpret sensitive content. Thus, we conduct a fine-grained analysis of the impact of specific words within prompts, distinguishing between dirty words that are essential for NSFW content generation and discrepant words that highlight the different sensitivity assessments between T2I models and safety checkers. Through the sensitivity-aware mutation, TokenProber generates adversarial prompts, striking a balance between maintaining NSFW content generation and evading detection. Our evaluation of TokenProber against 5 safety checkers on 3 popular T2I models, using 324 NSFW prompts, demonstrates its superior effectiveness in bypassing safety filters compared to existing methods (e.g., 54%+ increase on average), highlighting TokenProber's ability to uncover robustness issues in the existing refusal mechanisms.

Massive activations are scalar values in transformer hidden states that achieve values orders of magnitude larger than typical activations and have been shown to be critical for model functionality. While prior work has characterized these phenomena in fully trained models, the temporal dynamics of their emergence during training remain poorly understood. We present the first comprehensive analysis of massive activation development throughout transformer training, using the Pythia model family as our testbed. Through systematic analysis of various model sizes across multiple training checkpoints, we demonstrate that massive activation emergence follows predictable mathematical patterns that can be accurately modeled using an exponentially-modulated logarithmic function with five key parameters. We develop a machine learning framework to predict these mathematical parameters from architectural specifications alone, achieving high accuracy for steady-state behavior and moderate accuracy for emergence timing and magnitude. These findings enable architects to predict and potentially control key aspects of massive activation emergence through design choices, with significant implications for model stability, training cycle length, interpretability, and optimization. Our findings demonstrate that the emergence of massive activations is governed by model design and can be anticipated, and potentially controlled, before training begins.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are widely used in vision-language reasoning tasks. However, their vulnerability to adversarial prompts remains a serious concern, as safety mechanisms often fail to prevent the generation of harmful outputs. Although recent jailbreak strategies report high success rates, many responses classified as "successful" are actually benign, vague, or unrelated to the intended malicious goal. This mismatch suggests that current evaluation standards may overestimate the effectiveness of such attacks. To address this issue, we introduce a four-axis evaluation framework that considers input on-topicness, input out-of-distribution (OOD) intensity, output harmfulness, and output refusal rate. This framework identifies truly effective jailbreaks. In a substantial empirical study, we reveal a structural trade-off: highly on-topic prompts are frequently blocked by safety filters, whereas those that are too OOD often evade detection but fail to produce harmful content. However, prompts that balance relevance and novelty are more likely to evade filters and trigger dangerous output. Building on this insight, we develop a recursive rewriting strategy called Balanced Structural Decomposition (BSD). The approach restructures malicious prompts into semantically aligned sub-tasks, while introducing subtle OOD signals and visual cues that make the inputs harder to detect. BSD was tested across 13 commercial and open-source MLLMs, where it consistently led to higher attack success rates, more harmful outputs, and fewer refusals. Compared to previous methods, it improves success rates by 67% and harmfulness by 21%, revealing a previously underappreciated weakness in current multimodal safety systems.

Machine unlearning aims to remove sensitive or undesired data from large language models. However, recent studies suggest that unlearning is often shallow, claiming that removed knowledge can easily be recovered. In this work, we critically examine standard unlearning evaluation practices and uncover key limitations that shake our trust in those findings. First, we show that some evaluations introduce substantial new information into the model, potentially masking true unlearning performance by re-teaching the model during testing. Second, we demonstrate that evaluation outcomes vary significantly across tasks, undermining the generalizability of current evaluation routines. Finally, we find that many evaluations rely on spurious correlations, making their results difficult to trust and interpret. Taken together, these issues suggest that current evaluation protocols may both overstate and understate unlearning success. To address this, we propose two principles for future unlearning evaluations: minimal information injection and downstream task awareness. We validate these principles through a series of targeted experiments, showing how violations of each can lead to misleading conclusions.

Large language model (LLM) unlearning has become a critical topic in machine learning, aiming to eliminate the influence of specific training data or knowledge without retraining the model from scratch. A variety of techniques have been proposed, including Gradient Ascent, model editing, and re-steering hidden representations. While existing surveys often organize these methods by their technical characteristics, such classifications tend to overlook a more fundamental dimension: the underlying intention of unlearning--whether it seeks to truly remove internal knowledge or merely suppress its behavioral effects. In this SoK paper, we propose a new taxonomy based on this intention-oriented perspective. Building on this taxonomy, we make three key contributions. First, we revisit recent findings suggesting that many removal methods may functionally behave like suppression, and explore whether true removal is necessary or achievable. Second, we survey existing evaluation strategies, identify limitations in current metrics and benchmarks, and suggest directions for developing more reliable and intention-aligned evaluations. Third, we highlight practical challenges--such as scalability and support for sequential unlearning--that currently hinder the broader deployment of unlearning methods. In summary, this work offers a comprehensive framework for understanding and advancing unlearning in generative AI, aiming to support future research and guide policy decisions around data removal and privacy.

As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in safety-critical settings, it is essential to ensure that their responses comply with safety standards. Prior research has revealed that LLMs often fail to grasp the notion of safe behaviors, resulting in either unjustified refusals to harmless prompts or the generation of harmful content. While substantial efforts have been made to improve their robustness, existing defenses often rely on costly fine-tuning of model parameters or employ suboptimal heuristic techniques. In this work, we take a novel approach to safeguard LLMs by learning to adapt the system prompts in instruction-tuned LLMs. While LLMs are typically pre-trained to follow a fixed system prompt, we investigate the impact of tailoring the system prompt to each specific user input on the safety of the responses. To this end, we propose Sysformer, a transformer model that updates an initial system prompt to a more robust system prompt in the LLM input embedding space while attending to the user prompt. While keeping the LLM parameters frozen, the Sysformer is trained to refuse to respond to a set of harmful prompts while responding ideally to a set of safe ones. Through extensive experiments on 5 LLMs from different families and 2 recent benchmarks, we demonstrate that Sysformer can significantly enhance the robustness of LLMs, leading to upto 80% gain in the refusal rate on harmful prompts while enhancing the compliance with the safe prompts by upto 90%. Results also generalize well to sophisticated jailbreaking attacks, making LLMs upto 100% more robust against different attack strategies. We hope our findings lead to cheaper safeguarding of LLMs and motivate future investigations into designing variable system prompts.

Text-to-Image (T2I) models have achieved remarkable success in generating visual content from text inputs. Although multiple safety alignment strategies have been proposed to prevent harmful outputs, they often lead to overly cautious behavior -- rejecting even benign prompts -- a phenomenon known as over-refusal that reduces the practical utility of T2I models. Despite over-refusal having been observed in practice, there is no large-scale benchmark that systematically evaluates this phenomenon for T2I models. In this paper, we present an automatic workflow to construct synthetic evaluation data, resulting in OVERT (OVEr-Refusal evaluation on Text-to-image models), the first large-scale benchmark for assessing over-refusal behaviors in T2I models. OVERT includes 4,600 seemingly harmful but benign prompts across nine safety-related categories, along with 1,785 genuinely harmful prompts (OVERT-unsafe) to evaluate the safety-utility trade-off. Using OVERT, we evaluate several leading T2I models and find that over-refusal is a widespread issue across various categories (Figure 1), underscoring the need for further research to enhance the safety alignment of T2I models without compromising their functionality. As a preliminary attempt to reduce over-refusal, we explore prompt rewriting; however, we find it often compromises faithfulness to the meaning of the original prompts. Finally, we demonstrate the flexibility of our generation framework in accommodating diverse safety requirements by generating customized evaluation data adapting to user-defined policies.

Catastrophic forgetting remains a significant challenge to continual learning for decades. While recent works have proposed effective methods to mitigate this problem, they mainly focus on the algorithmic side. Meanwhile, we do not fully understand what architectural properties of neural networks lead to catastrophic forgetting. This study aims to fill this gap by studying the role of activation functions in the training dynamics of neural networks and their impact on catastrophic forgetting. Our study reveals that, besides sparse representations, the gradient sparsity of activation functions also plays an important role in reducing forgetting. Based on this insight, we propose a new class of activation functions, elephant activation functions, that can generate both sparse representations and sparse gradients. We show that by simply replacing classical activation functions with elephant activation functions, we can significantly improve the resilience of neural networks to catastrophic forgetting. Our method has broad applicability and benefits for continual learning in regression, class incremental learning, and reinforcement learning tasks. Specifically, we achieves excellent performance on Split MNIST dataset in just one single pass, without using replay buffer, task boundary information, or pre-training.

The choice of activation functions in deep networks has a significant effect on the training dynamics and task performance. Currently, the most successful and widely-used activation function is the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU). Although various hand-designed alternatives to ReLU have been proposed, none have managed to replace it due to inconsistent gains. In this work, we propose to leverage automatic search techniques to discover new activation functions. Using a combination of exhaustive and reinforcement learning-based search, we discover multiple novel activation functions. We verify the effectiveness of the searches by conducting an empirical evaluation with the best discovered activation function. Our experiments show that the best discovered activation function, f(x) = x cdot sigmoid(beta x), which we name Swish, tends to work better than ReLU on deeper models across a number of challenging datasets. For example, simply replacing ReLUs with Swish units improves top-1 classification accuracy on ImageNet by 0.9\% for Mobile NASNet-A and 0.6\% for Inception-ResNet-v2. The simplicity of Swish and its similarity to ReLU make it easy for practitioners to replace ReLUs with Swish units in any neural network.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at generating fluent text, but their internal reasoning remains opaque and difficult to control. Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) make hidden activations more interpretable by exposing latent features that often align with human concepts. Yet, these features are fragile and passive, offering no mechanism for systematic reasoning or model control. To address this, we introduce ActivationReasoning (AR), a framework that embeds explicit logical reasoning into the latent space of LLMs. It proceeds in three stages: (1) Finding latent representations, first latent concept representations are identified (e.g., via SAEs) and organized into a dictionary; (2) Activating propositions, at inference time AR detects activating concepts and maps them to logical propositions; and (3)Logical reasoning, applying logical rules over these propositions to infer higher-order structures, compose new concepts, and steer model behavior. We evaluate AR on multi-hop reasoning (PrOntoQA), abstraction and robustness to indirect concept cues (Rail2Country), reasoning over natural and diverse language (ProverQA), and context-sensitive safety (BeaverTails). Across all tasks, AR scales robustly with reasoning complexity, generalizes to abstract and context-sensitive tasks, and transfers across model backbones. These results demonstrate that grounding logical structure in latent activations not only improves transparency but also enables structured reasoning, reliable control, and alignment with desired behaviors, providing a path toward more reliable and auditable AI.

Language models can retain dangerous knowledge and skills even after extensive safety fine-tuning, posing both misuse and misalignment risks. Recent studies show that even specialized unlearning methods can be easily reversed. To address this, we systematically evaluate many existing and novel components of unlearning methods and identify ones crucial for irreversible unlearning. We introduce Disruption Masking, a technique in which we only allow updating weights, where the signs of the unlearning gradient and the retaining gradient are the same. This ensures all updates are non-disruptive. Additionally, we identify the need for normalizing the unlearning gradients, and also confirm the usefulness of meta-learning. We combine these insights into MUDMAN (Meta-Unlearning with Disruption Masking and Normalization) and validate its effectiveness at preventing the recovery of dangerous capabilities. MUDMAN outperforms the prior TAR method by 40%, setting a new state-of-the-art for robust unlearning.

Activation steering methods were shown to be effective in conditioning language model generation by additively intervening over models' intermediate representations. However, the evaluation of these techniques has so far been limited to single conditioning properties and synthetic settings. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of various activation steering strategies, highlighting the property-dependent nature of optimal parameters to ensure a robust effect throughout generation. To address this issue, we propose Dynamic Activation Composition, an information-theoretic approach to modulate the steering intensity of one or more properties throughout generation. Our experiments on multi-property steering show that our method successfully maintains high conditioning while minimizing the impact of conditioning on generation fluency.

Prompt-based learning paradigm bridges the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, and works effectively under the few-shot setting. However, we find that this learning paradigm inherits the vulnerability from the pre-training stage, where model predictions can be misled by inserting certain triggers into the text. In this paper, we explore this universal vulnerability by either injecting backdoor triggers or searching for adversarial triggers on pre-trained language models using only plain text. In both scenarios, we demonstrate that our triggers can totally control or severely decrease the performance of prompt-based models fine-tuned on arbitrary downstream tasks, reflecting the universal vulnerability of the prompt-based learning paradigm. Further experiments show that adversarial triggers have good transferability among language models. We also find conventional fine-tuning models are not vulnerable to adversarial triggers constructed from pre-trained language models. We conclude by proposing a potential solution to mitigate our attack methods. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/leix28/prompt-universal-vulnerability

Large language models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak and direct prompt-injection attacks, yet the strongest defensive filters frequently over-refuse benign queries and degrade user experience. Previous work on jailbreak and prompt injection detection such as GradSafe, detects unsafe prompts with a single "accept all" anchor token, but its threshold is brittle and it offers no deterministic guarantee that harmful content will not be emitted once decoding begins. We introduce Gradient-Controlled Decoding (GCD), a training-free guardrail that combines an acceptance anchor token ("Sure") and refusal anchor token ("Sorry") tightening the decision boundary and significantly lowering false positives. In the mitigation stage, if a prompt is flagged, GCD preset-injects one or two refusal tokens ("Sorry, I can't...") before autoregressive decoding resumes, guaranteeing first-token safety regardless of sampling strategy. On ToxicChat, XSTest-v2, and AdvBench, GCD reduces false positives by 52% vs. GradSafe at comparable recall, lowers attack success rate by up to 10% vs. the strongest decoding-only baseline, adds under 15-20 ms latency on an average on V100 instances, transfers to LLaMA-2-7B, Mixtral-8x7B, and Qwen-2-7B, and requires only 20 demonstration templates.

Recent latent-space monitoring techniques have shown promise as defenses against LLM attacks. These defenses act as scanners that seek to detect harmful activations before they lead to undesirable actions. This prompts the question: Can models execute harmful behavior via inconspicuous latent states? Here, we study such obfuscated activations. We show that state-of-the-art latent-space defenses -- including sparse autoencoders, representation probing, and latent OOD detection -- are all vulnerable to obfuscated activations. For example, against probes trained to classify harmfulness, our attacks can often reduce recall from 100% to 0% while retaining a 90% jailbreaking rate. However, obfuscation has limits: we find that on a complex task (writing SQL code), obfuscation reduces model performance. Together, our results demonstrate that neural activations are highly malleable: we can reshape activation patterns in a variety of ways, often while preserving a network's behavior. This poses a fundamental challenge to latent-space defenses.

Currently, pre-trained models can be considered the default choice for a wide range of NLP tasks. Despite their SoTA results, there is practical evidence that these models may require a different number of computing layers for different input sequences, since evaluating all layers leads to overconfidence in wrong predictions (namely overthinking). This problem can potentially be solved by implementing adaptive computation time approaches, which were first designed to improve inference speed. Recently proposed PonderNet may be a promising solution for performing an early exit by treating the exit layer's index as a latent variable. However, the originally proposed exit criterion, relying on sampling from trained posterior distribution on the probability of exiting from the i-th layer, introduces major variance in exit layer indices, significantly reducing the resulting model's performance. In this paper, we propose improving PonderNet with a novel deterministic Q-exit criterion and a revisited model architecture. We adapted the proposed mechanism to ALBERT and RoBERTa and compared it with recent methods for performing an early exit. We observed that the proposed changes can be considered significant improvements on the original PonderNet architecture and outperform PABEE on a wide range of GLUE tasks. In addition, we also performed an in-depth ablation study of the proposed architecture to further understand Lambda layers and their performance.

Abstention, the refusal of large language models (LLMs) to provide an answer, is increasingly recognized for its potential to mitigate hallucinations and enhance safety in building LLM systems. In this survey, we introduce a framework to examine abstention behavior from three perspectives: the query, the model, and human values. We review the literature on abstention methods (categorized based on the development stages of LLMs), benchmarks, and evaluation metrics, and discuss the merits and limitations of prior work. We further identify and motivate areas for future research, such as encouraging the study of abstention as a meta-capability across tasks and customizing abstention abilities based on context. In doing so, we aim to broaden the scope and impact of abstention methodologies in AI systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

Despite investments in improving model safety, studies show that misaligned capabilities remain latent in safety-tuned models. In this work, we shed light on the mechanics of this phenomenon. First, we show that even when model generations are safe, harmful content can persist in hidden representations and can be extracted by decoding from earlier layers. Then, we show that whether the model divulges such content depends significantly on its perception of who it is talking to, which we refer to as user persona. In fact, we find manipulating user persona to be even more effective for eliciting harmful content than direct attempts to control model refusal. We study both natural language prompting and activation steering as control methods and show that activation steering is significantly more effective at bypassing safety filters. We investigate why certain personas break model safeguards and find that they enable the model to form more charitable interpretations of otherwise dangerous queries. Finally, we show we can predict a persona's effect on refusal given only the geometry of its steering vector.

Machine unlearning for LLMs aims to remove sensitive or copyrighted data from trained models. However, the true efficacy of current unlearning methods remains uncertain. Standard evaluation metrics rely on benign queries that often mistake superficial information suppression for genuine knowledge removal. Such metrics fail to detect residual knowledge that more sophisticated prompting strategies could still extract. We introduce REBEL, an evolutionary approach for adversarial prompt generation designed to probe whether unlearned data can still be recovered. Our experiments demonstrate that REBEL successfully elicits ``forgotten'' knowledge from models that seemed to be forgotten in standard unlearning benchmarks, revealing that current unlearning methods may provide only a superficial layer of protection. We validate our framework on subsets of the TOFU and WMDP benchmarks, evaluating performance across a diverse suite of unlearning algorithms. Our experiments show that REBEL consistently outperforms static baselines, recovering ``forgotten'' knowledge with Attack Success Rates (ASRs) reaching up to 60% on TOFU and 93% on WMDP. We will make all code publicly available upon acceptance. Code is available at https://github.com/patryk-rybak/REBEL/

Activation monitoring, which probes a model's internal states using lightweight classifiers, is an emerging tool for AI safety. However, its worst-case robustness under a misalignment threat model--where a model might learn to actively conceal its internal states--remains untested. Focusing on this threat model, we ask: could a model learn to evade previously unseen activation monitors? Our core contribution is to stress-test the learnability of this behavior. We demonstrate that finetuning can create Neural Chameleons: models capable of zero-shot evading activation monitors. Specifically, we fine-tune an LLM to evade monitors for a set of benign concepts (e.g., languages, HTML) when conditioned on a trigger of the form: "You are being probed for {concept}". We show that this learned mechanism generalizes zero-shot: by substituting {concept} with a safety-relevant term like 'deception', the model successfully evades previously unseen safety monitors. We validate this phenomenon across diverse model families (Llama, Gemma, Qwen), showing that the evasion succeeds even against monitors trained post hoc on the model's frozen weights. This evasion is highly selective, targeting only the specific concept mentioned in the trigger, and having a modest impact on model capabilities on standard benchmarks. Using Gemma-2-9b-it as a case study, a mechanistic analysis reveals this is achieved via a targeted manipulation that moves activations into a low-dimensional subspace. While stronger defenses like monitor ensembles and non-linear classifiers show greater resilience, the model retains a non-trivial evasion capability. Our work provides a proof-of-concept for this failure mode and a tool to evaluate the worst-case robustness of monitoring techniques against misalignment threat models.

The drastic increase of large language models' (LLMs) parameters has led to a new research direction of fine-tuning-free downstream customization by prompts, i.e., task descriptions. While these prompt-based services (e.g. OpenAI's GPTs) play an important role in many businesses, there has emerged growing concerns about the prompt leakage, which undermines the intellectual properties of these services and causes downstream attacks. In this paper, we analyze the underlying mechanism of prompt leakage, which we refer to as prompt memorization, and develop corresponding defending strategies. By exploring the scaling laws in prompt extraction, we analyze key attributes that influence prompt extraction, including model sizes, prompt lengths, as well as the types of prompts. Then we propose two hypotheses that explain how LLMs expose their prompts. The first is attributed to the perplexity, i.e. the familiarity of LLMs to texts, whereas the second is based on the straightforward token translation path in attention matrices. To defend against such threats, we investigate whether alignments can undermine the extraction of prompts. We find that current LLMs, even those with safety alignments like GPT-4, are highly vulnerable to prompt extraction attacks, even under the most straightforward user attacks. Therefore, we put forward several defense strategies with the inspiration of our findings, which achieve 83.8\% and 71.0\% drop in the prompt extraction rate for Llama2-7B and GPT-3.5, respectively. Source code is avaliable at https://github.com/liangzid/PromptExtractionEval.

Deep learning and language models are increasingly dominating automated program repair research. While previous generate-and-validate approaches were able to find and use fix ingredients on a file or even project level, neural language models are limited to the code that fits their input window. In this work we investigate how important identifier ingredients are in neural program repair and present ScanFix, an approach that leverages an additional scanner model to extract identifiers from a bug's file and potentially project-level context. We find that lack of knowledge of far-away identifiers is an important cause of failed repairs. Augmenting repair model input with scanner-extracted identifiers yields relative improvements of up to 31%. However, ScanFix is outperformed by a model with a large input window (> 5k tokens). When passing ingredients from the ground-truth fix, improvements are even higher. This shows that, with refined extraction techniques, ingredient scanning, similar to fix candidate ranking, could have the potential to become an important subtask of future automated repair systems. At the same time, it also demonstrates that this idea is subject to Sutton's bitter lesson and may be rendered unnecessary by new code models with ever-increasing context windows.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encode behaviors such as refusal within their activation space, yet identifying these behaviors remains a significant challenge. Existing methods often rely on predefined refusal templates detectable in output tokens or require manual analysis. We introduce COSMIC (Cosine Similarity Metrics for Inversion of Concepts), an automated framework for direction selection that identifies viable steering directions and target layers using cosine similarity - entirely independent of model outputs. COSMIC achieves steering performance comparable to prior methods without requiring assumptions about a model's refusal behavior, such as the presence of specific refusal tokens. It reliably identifies refusal directions in adversarial settings and weakly aligned models, and is capable of steering such models toward safer behavior with minimal increase in false refusals, demonstrating robustness across a wide range of alignment conditions.

We introduce stochastic activations. This novel strategy randomly selects between several non-linear functions in the feed-forward layer of a large language model. In particular, we choose between SILU or RELU depending on a Bernoulli draw. This strategy circumvents the optimization problem associated with RELU, namely, the constant shape for negative inputs that prevents the gradient flow. We leverage this strategy in two ways: (1) We use stochastic activations during pre-training and fine-tune the model with RELU, which is used at inference time to provide sparse latent vectors. This reduces the inference FLOPs and translates into a significant speedup in the CPU. Interestingly, this leads to much better results than training from scratch with the RELU activation function. (2) We evaluate stochastic activations for generation. This strategy performs reasonably well: it is only slightly inferior to the best deterministic non-linearity, namely SILU combined with temperature scaling. This offers an alternative to existing strategies by providing a controlled way to increase the diversity of the generated text.

In recent years, Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) algorithms have achieved state-of-the-art performance in many challenging strategy games. Because these games have complicated rules, an action sampled from the full discrete action distribution predicted by the learned policy is likely to be invalid according to the game rules (e.g., walking into a wall). The usual approach to deal with this problem in policy gradient algorithms is to "mask out" invalid actions and just sample from the set of valid actions. The implications of this process, however, remain under-investigated. In this paper, we 1) show theoretical justification for such a practice, 2) empirically demonstrate its importance as the space of invalid actions grows, and 3) provide further insights by evaluating different action masking regimes, such as removing masking after an agent has been trained using masking. The source code can be found at https://github.com/vwxyzjn/invalid-action-masking

Recent advances in text-to-image diffusion models have demonstrated remarkable generation capabilities, yet they raise significant concerns regarding safety, copyright, and ethical implications. Existing concept erasure methods address these risks by removing sensitive concepts from pre-trained models, but most of them rely on data-intensive and computationally expensive fine-tuning, which poses a critical limitation. To overcome these challenges, inspired by the observation that the model's activations are predominantly composed of generic concepts, with only a minimal component can represent the target concept, we propose a novel training-free method (ActErase) for efficient concept erasure. Specifically, the proposed method operates by identifying activation difference regions via prompt-pair analysis, extracting target activations and dynamically replacing input activations during forward passes. Comprehensive evaluations across three critical erasure tasks (nudity, artistic style, and object removal) demonstrates that our training-free method achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) erasure performance, while effectively preserving the model's overall generative capability. Our approach also exhibits strong robustness against adversarial attacks, establishing a new plug-and-play paradigm for lightweight yet effective concept manipulation in diffusion models.

Existing training-time safety alignment techniques for large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Direct preference optimization (DPO), a widely deployed alignment method, exhibits limitations in both experimental and theoretical contexts as its loss function proves suboptimal for refusal learning. Through gradient-based analysis, we identify these shortcomings and propose an improved safety alignment that disentangles DPO objectives into two components: (1) robust refusal training, which encourages refusal even when partial unsafe generations are produced, and (2) targeted unlearning of harmful knowledge. This approach significantly increases LLM robustness against a wide range of jailbreak attacks, including prefilling, suffix, and multi-turn attacks across both in-distribution and out-of-distribution scenarios. Furthermore, we introduce a method to emphasize critical refusal tokens by incorporating a reward-based token-level weighting mechanism for refusal learning, which further improves the robustness against adversarial exploits. Our research also suggests that robustness to jailbreak attacks is correlated with token distribution shifts in the training process and internal representations of refusal and harmful tokens, offering valuable directions for future research in LLM safety alignment. The code is available at https://github.com/wicai24/DOOR-Alignment

Despite the rapid development of safety alignment techniques for LLMs, defending against multi-turn jailbreaks is still a challenging task. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive comparison, revealing that some existing defense methods can improve the robustness of LLMs against multi-turn jailbreaks but compromise usability, i.e., reducing general capabilities or causing the over-refusal problem. From the perspective of mechanism interpretability of LLMs, we discover that these methods fail to establish a boundary that exactly distinguishes safe and harmful feature representations. Therefore, boundary-safe representations close to harmful representations are inevitably disrupted, leading to a decline in usability. To address this issue, we propose X-Boundary to push harmful representations away from boundary-safe representations and obtain an exact distinction boundary. In this way, harmful representations can be precisely erased without disrupting safe ones. Experimental results show that X-Boundary achieves state-of-the-art defense performance against multi-turn jailbreaks, while reducing the over-refusal rate by about 20% and maintaining nearly complete general capability. Furthermore, we theoretically prove and empirically verify that X-Boundary can accelerate the convergence process during training. Please see our code at: https://github.com/AI45Lab/X-Boundary.

Recent work on domain-specific reasoning with large language models (LLMs) often relies on training-intensive approaches that require parameter updates. While activation steering has emerged as a parameter efficient alternative, existing methods apply static, manual interventions that fail to adapt to the dynamic nature of complex reasoning. To address this limitation, we propose RISER (Router-based Intervention for Steerable Enhancement of Reasoning), a plug-and-play intervention framework that adaptively steers LLM reasoning in activation space. RISER constructs a library of reusable reasoning vectors and employs a lightweight Router to dynamically compose them for each input. The Router is optimized via reinforcement learning under task-level rewards, activating latent cognitive primitives in an emergent and compositional manner. Across seven diverse benchmarks, RISER yields 3.4-6.5% average zero-shot accuracy improvements over the base model while surpassing CoT-style reasoning with 2-3x higher token efficiency and robust accuracy gains. Further analysis shows that RISER autonomously combines multiple vectors into interpretable, precise control strategies, pointing toward more controllable and efficient LLM reasoning.

Foundation models have transformed multimedia analysis by enabling robust and transferable representations across diverse modalities and tasks. However, their static deployment conflicts with growing societal and regulatory demands -- particularly the need to unlearn specific data upon request, as mandated by privacy frameworks such as the GDPR. Traditional unlearning approaches, including retraining, activation editing, or distillation, are often computationally expensive, fragile, and ill-suited for real-time or continuously evolving systems. In this paper, we propose a paradigm shift: rethinking unlearning not as a retroactive intervention but as a built-in capability. We introduce a prompt-based learning framework that unifies knowledge acquisition and removal within a single training phase. Rather than encoding information in model weights, our approach binds class-level semantics to dedicated prompt tokens. This design enables instant unlearning simply by removing the corresponding prompt -- without retraining, model modification, or access to original data. Experiments demonstrate that our framework preserves predictive performance on retained classes while effectively erasing forgotten ones. Beyond utility, our method exhibits strong privacy and security guarantees: it is resistant to membership inference attacks, and prompt removal prevents any residual knowledge extraction, even under adversarial conditions. This ensures compliance with data protection principles and safeguards against unauthorized access to forgotten information, making the framework suitable for deployment in sensitive and regulated environments. Overall, by embedding removability into the architecture itself, this work establishes a new foundation for designing modular, scalable and ethically responsive AI models.

Fine tuning has been regarded as a de facto approach for adapting large language models (LLMs) to downstream tasks, but the high training memory consumption inherited from LLMs makes this process inefficient. Among existing memory efficient approaches, activation-related optimization has proven particularly effective, as activations consistently dominate overall memory consumption. Although prior arts offer various activation optimization strategies, their data-agnostic nature ultimately results in ineffective and unstable fine tuning. In this paper, we propose TokenSeek, a universal plugin solution for various transformer-based models through instance-aware token seeking and ditching, achieving significant fine-tuning memory savings (e.g., requiring only 14.8% of the memory on Llama3.2 1B) with on-par or even better performance. Furthermore, our interpretable token seeking process reveals the underlying reasons for its effectiveness, offering valuable insights for future research on token efficiency. Homepage: https://runjia.tech/iclr_tokenseek/

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in a variety of important applications, yet their safety and reliability remain as major concerns. Various adversarial and jailbreak attacks have been proposed to bypass the safety alignment and cause the model to produce harmful responses. We introduce Self-supervised Prompt INjection (SPIN) which can detect and reverse these various attacks on LLMs. As our self-supervised prompt defense is done at inference-time, it is also compatible with existing alignment and adds an additional layer of safety for defense. Our benchmarks demonstrate that our system can reduce the attack success rate by up to 87.9%, while maintaining the performance on benign user requests. In addition, we discuss the situation of an adaptive attacker and show that our method is still resilient against attackers who are aware of our defense.

The growing use of generative models in daily life calls for efficient mechanisms to control their generation, to e.g., produce safe content or provide users with tools to explore style changes. Ideally, such mechanisms should require low volume of unpaired data (i.e., without explicit preference), and should be cheap, both at train and inference time, while preserving output quality. Recent research has shown that such mechanisms can be obtained by intervening exclusively on model activations, with the goal of correcting distributional differences between activations seen when using prompts from a source vs. a target set (e.g., toxic and non-toxic sentences). While cheap, these fast methods are inherently crude: their maps are tuned locally, not accounting for their impact on downstream layers, resulting in interventions that cause unintended shifts when used out-of-sample. We propose in this work linear end-to-end activation steering (LinEAS), an approach trained with a global loss that accounts simultaneously for all layer-wise distributional shifts. In addition to being more robust, the loss used to train LinEAS can be regularized with sparsifying norms, which can automatically carry out neuron selection. LinEAS only requires a handful of unpaired samples to be effective, and beats similar baselines on toxicity mitigation in language models, becoming competitive with oracle-dependent methods that have access to strong supervision. LinEAS is modality-agnostic and we empirically find that it outperforms existing activation steering methods at mitigating and including new concepts at the output of single-step text-to-image generation models.

How should we evaluate the robustness of language model defenses? Current defenses against jailbreaks and prompt injections (which aim to prevent an attacker from eliciting harmful knowledge or remotely triggering malicious actions, respectively) are typically evaluated either against a static set of harmful attack strings, or against computationally weak optimization methods that were not designed with the defense in mind. We argue that this evaluation process is flawed. Instead, we should evaluate defenses against adaptive attackers who explicitly modify their attack strategy to counter a defense's design while spending considerable resources to optimize their objective. By systematically tuning and scaling general optimization techniques-gradient descent, reinforcement learning, random search, and human-guided exploration-we bypass 12 recent defenses (based on a diverse set of techniques) with attack success rate above 90% for most; importantly, the majority of defenses originally reported near-zero attack success rates. We believe that future defense work must consider stronger attacks, such as the ones we describe, in order to make reliable and convincing claims of robustness.

Controlling undesirable Large Language Model (LLM) behaviors, such as the generation of unsafe content or failing to adhere to safety guidelines, often relies on costly fine-tuning. Activation steering provides an alternative for inference-time control, but existing methods typically lack fine-grained, adaptive mechanisms. We introduce a novel approach using a lightweight, trainable controller network integrated during inference. This controller network observes specific intermediate LLM activations and predicts both a global scaling factor and layer-specific weights. The predicted global scaling factor and layer-specific weights then dynamically modulate the intensity of a steering patch, derived from a pre-computed "refusal direction" vector, applied across the LLM's layers during generation. Trained on activations from both harmful and benign prompts, our controller learns to discriminatively apply nuanced, layer-aware interventions, activating steering primarily for harmful inputs. Experiments using safety benchmarks like ToxicChat & In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts demonstrate that our weighted steering controller significantly increases refusal rates compared to the base LLM, achieving targeted behavioral modification without altering the original model parameters. Our experiments with Llama-3.1-8B, Llama-3.2-1B & Mistral-7B show our approach outperforms existing methods, presenting an efficient and adaptive method for fine-grained control over LLM behavior at inference time.

Despite extensive safety-tuning, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks via adversarially crafted instructions, reflecting a persistent trade-off between safety and task performance. In this work, we propose Intent-FT, a simple and lightweight fine-tuning approach that explicitly trains LLMs to infer the underlying intent of an instruction before responding. By fine-tuning on a targeted set of adversarial instructions, Intent-FT enables LLMs to generalize intent deduction to unseen attacks, thereby substantially improving their robustness. We comprehensively evaluate both parametric and non-parametric attacks across open-source and proprietary models, considering harmfulness from attacks, utility, over-refusal, and impact against white-box threats. Empirically, Intent-FT consistently mitigates all evaluated attack categories, with no single attack exceeding a 50\% success rate -- whereas existing defenses remain only partially effective. Importantly, our method preserves the model's general capabilities and reduces excessive refusals on benign instructions containing superficially harmful keywords. Furthermore, models trained with Intent-FT accurately identify hidden harmful intent in adversarial attacks, and these learned intentions can be effectively transferred to enhance vanilla model defenses. We publicly release our code at https://github.com/wj210/Intent_Jailbreak.

Prepending model inputs with safety prompts is a common practice of safeguarding large language models (LLMs) from complying with queries that contain harmful intents. However, the working mechanisms of safety prompts have not yet been fully understood, which hinders the potential for automatically optimizing them for improved LLM safety. Motivated by this problem, we investigate the impact of safety prompts from the perspective of model representations. We find that in models' representation space, harmful and harmless queries can be largely distinguished, but this is not noticeably enhanced by safety prompts. Instead, the queries' representations are moved by different safety prompts in similar directions, where models become more prone to refusal (i.e., refusing to provide assistance) even when the queries are harmless. Inspired by these findings, we propose a method called DRO (Directed Representation Optimization) for automatic safety prompt optimization. DRO treats safety prompts as continuous, trainable embeddings and learns to move the representations of harmful/harmless queries along/opposite the direction in which the model's refusal probability increases. We demonstrate that DRO remarkably improves the safeguarding performance of human-crafted safety prompts and outperforms strong baselines, as evaluated on out-of-domain benchmarks, without compromising the general model capability.

Despite significant progress in alignment, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks that elicit harmful behaviors. Activation steering techniques offer a promising inference-time intervention approach, but existing methods suffer from critical limitations: activation addition requires careful coefficient tuning and is sensitive to layer-specific norm variations, while directional ablation provides only binary control. Recent work on Angular Steering introduces continuous control via rotation in a 2D subspace, but its practical implementation violates norm preservation, causing distribution shift and generation collapse, particularly in models below 7B parameters. We propose Selective Steering, which addresses these limitations through two key innovations: (1) a mathematically rigorous norm-preserving rotation formulation that maintains activation distribution integrity, and (2) discriminative layer selection that applies steering only where feature representations exhibit opposite-signed class alignment. Experiments across nine models demonstrate that Selective Steering achieves 5.5x higher attack success rates than prior methods while maintaining zero perplexity violations and approximately 100\% capability retention on standard benchmarks. Our approach provides a principled, efficient framework for controllable and stable LLM behavior modification. Code: https://github.com/knoveleng/steering

While instruction-tuned language models have demonstrated impressive zero-shot generalization, these models often struggle to generate accurate responses when faced with instructions that fall outside their training set. This paper presents Instructive Decoding (ID), a simple yet effective approach that augments the efficacy of instruction-tuned models. Specifically, ID adjusts the logits for next-token prediction in a contrastive manner, utilizing predictions generated from a manipulated version of the original instruction, referred to as a noisy instruction. This noisy instruction aims to elicit responses that could diverge from the intended instruction yet remain plausible. We conduct experiments across a spectrum of such noisy instructions, ranging from those that insert semantic noise via random words to others like 'opposite' that elicit the deviated responses. Our approach achieves considerable performance gains across various instruction-tuned models and tasks without necessitating any additional parameter updates. Notably, utilizing 'opposite' as the noisy instruction in ID, which exhibits the maximum divergence from the original instruction, consistently produces the most significant performance gains across multiple models and tasks.

Large Language Models are prone to memorizing sensitive, copyrighted, or hazardous content, posing significant privacy and legal concerns. Retraining from scratch is computationally infeasible, whereas current unlearning methods exhibit unstable trade-offs between forgetting and utility, frequently producing incoherent outputs on forget prompts and failing to generalize due to the persistence of lexical-level and semantic-level associations in attention. We propose Attention Smoothing Unlearning (ASU), a principled framework that casts unlearning as self-distillation from a forget-teacher derived from the model's own attention. By increasing the softmax temperature, ASU flattens attention distributions and directly suppresses the lexical-level and semantic-level associations responsible for reconstructing memorized knowledge. This results in a bounded optimization objective that erases factual information yet maintains coherence in responses to forget prompts. Empirical evaluation on TOFU, MUSE, and WMDP, along with real-world and continual unlearning scenarios across question answering and text completion, demonstrates that ASU outperforms the baselines for most unlearning scenarios, delivering robust unlearning with minimal loss of model utility.

Text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models have achieved remarkable progress in generating high-quality images but also raise people's concerns about generating harmful or misleading content. While extensive approaches have been proposed to erase unwanted concepts without requiring retraining from scratch, they inadvertently degrade performance on normal generation tasks. In this work, we propose Interpret then Deactivate (ItD), a novel framework to enable precise concept removal in T2I diffusion models while preserving overall performance. ItD first employs a sparse autoencoder (SAE) to interpret each concept as a combination of multiple features. By permanently deactivating the specific features associated with target concepts, we repurpose SAE as a zero-shot classifier that identifies whether the input prompt includes target concepts, allowing selective concept erasure in diffusion models. Moreover, we demonstrate that ItD can be easily extended to erase multiple concepts without requiring further training. Comprehensive experiments across celebrity identities, artistic styles, and explicit content demonstrate ItD's effectiveness in eliminating targeted concepts without interfering with normal concept generation. Additionally, ItD is also robust against adversarial prompts designed to circumvent content filters. Code is available at: https://github.com/NANSirun/Interpret-then-deactivate.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in various tasks and have been extensively utilized by the public. However, the increasing concerns regarding the misuse of LLMs, such as plagiarism and spamming, have led to the development of multiple detectors, including fine-tuned classifiers and statistical methods. In this study, we equip LLMs with prompts, rather than relying on an external paraphraser, to evaluate the vulnerability of these detectors. We propose a novel Substitution-based In-Context example Optimization method (SICO) to automatically construct prompts for evading the detectors. SICO is cost-efficient as it requires only 40 human-written examples and a limited number of LLM inferences to generate a prompt. Moreover, once a task-specific prompt has been constructed, it can be universally used against a wide range of detectors. Extensive experiments across three real-world tasks demonstrate that SICO significantly outperforms the paraphraser baselines and enables GPT-3.5 to successfully evade six detectors, decreasing their AUC by 0.5 on average. Furthermore, a comprehensive human evaluation show that the SICO-generated text achieves human-level readability and task completion rates, while preserving high imperceptibility. Finally, we propose an ensemble approach to enhance the robustness of detectors against SICO attack. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/ColinLu50/Evade-GPT-Detector.

Machine unlearning is a promising approach to mitigate undesirable memorization of training data in ML models. However, in this work we show that existing approaches for unlearning in LLMs are surprisingly susceptible to a simple set of benign relearning attacks. With access to only a small and potentially loosely related set of data, we find that we can ''jog'' the memory of unlearned models to reverse the effects of unlearning. For example, we show that relearning on public medical articles can lead an unlearned LLM to output harmful knowledge about bioweapons, and relearning general wiki information about the book series Harry Potter can force the model to output verbatim memorized text. We formalize this unlearning-relearning pipeline, explore the attack across three popular unlearning benchmarks, and discuss future directions and guidelines that result from our study. Our work indicates that current approximate unlearning methods simply suppress the model outputs and fail to robustly forget target knowledge in the LLMs.